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ABSTRACT
Chapter 1 studies solution techniques for problems of dynamic
control under uncertainty with linear costs of control. Necessary
conditions for optimality of control policies are derived from a
feasible perturbation argument, and it is shown that under
restrictive conditions the optimal policy can be based on current
events only. A solution is explicitly derived under the assumption
of constant-elasticity functional forms and of uncertainty
described by geometric Brownian motion processes. Under these
assumption, an alternative approach to the solution is proposed,
based on optimal stopping arguments: using well-known financial
tAchniques, the solution can be found via valuation of options to
exercise control at the margin.
Chapter 2 applies the control technique to the problem of
irreversible capital accumulation. Under the realistic assumption
that capital equipment has no value unless used in production, the
optimal investment rule is derived in closed form. It is found
that the degree of uncertainty facing the firm is an important
determinant of the irreversible investment decision: the more
uncertain are future business conditions and the more variable is
the purchase price of capital, the more cautious firme should be
in their investment decisions. The dynamics of the firm's value
and the ergodic distribution of several observable variables are
derived, and a preliminary discussion is offered of the results'
implications for the empirical study of investment.
Chapter 3 studies the effect on labor demand of European
severance pay legislation. The form of firms' employment policies
is derived using the techniques developes in Chapter 1; firms are
more reluctant to hire in the presence of firing costs, but are
more reluctant to fire as well. It is found that employment is, on
average, higher when firing costs are large. The parameters of
stochastic processes taken as exogenous by firms are shown to
affect the employment policy in intuitive ways, and the European
employment experience of the last fifteen years is interpreted
under the assumption that a regime switch in the stochastic
environment of European firms occurred after the first oil shock.
Thesis Supervisor: Rudiger Dornbusch
Title: Professor of economics
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INTRODUCTION
This Thesis studies the optimal dynamic factor demand
policies of firms subject to exogenous uncertainty, under the
assumption that changes in the use of factors of production incur
first-order adjustment costs: the combination of uncertainty and
first-order costs of adjustment is on the one hand quite
realistic, and on the other has far-reaching implications for the
study of many issues in dynamic economics.
If adjustment costs for the use of factors of production did
not exist, the firm's dynamic problem would be uninteresting: all
factors would continuously be adjusted so that their marginal
contribution to profits would at all times be equal to their
rental cost. In reality, of course, the use of factors of
production cannot be costlessly adjusted: machinery and buildings
have to be installed and uninstalled, workers have to be trained,
and severance payments often have to be paid to dismissed workers;
second-hand capital equipment has much lower value than new
capital equipment, and is often so specialized that it can only be
sold to other firms faced by the same exogenous uncertainty. In
such a situation, capital has value only if used in production,
and capital accumulation is irreversible.
Realistic adjustment costs are nonnegligible even for small
adjustments in factors' use; the assumption that they are in fact
linear does less violence to reality than the more usual (and more
easily tractable) assumption of quadratic adjustment costs.
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Linearity of adjustment costs enhances the importance of
uncertainty in the firm's problem. Since adjustment entails
first-order costs, the firm has to be careful in exercising
control over the amount of factors of production it uses. If an
exogenous shock is immediately followed by one of opposite sign,
the firm will congratulate itself if it has not adjusted to the
first shock, and will regret the previous decision if it has;
conversely, if subsequent shocks have the same sign as the first
one, the firm will regret not having adjusted right away. Every
adjustment decision must then balance these possibilities, and has
to take explicit account of risk. The dynamics produced by linear
~djustment costs are very different from those produced by convex
ones. Convex costs of adjustment make it optimal to adjust only
partially to any shock; with linearity, adjustment is complete if
it occurs, but may not occur at all.
Chapter 1 illustrates a set of new techniques that make it
possible to solve fairly complicated and realistic models of tnis
type, and discuss their relationship to earlier economic and
financial literature and to abstract optimal control models in the
mathematical and engineering literature.
The main assumptions needed to obtain the solution are that
exogenous uncertainty be described in continuous time by a process
wi.th independent increments and continuous sample paths, and that
all functions relating exogenous and endogenous variables have
constant-elasticity form. The assumption of independent increments
(random walk) is clE!arly a simplification of reality. But, at
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least, nonstationarity of the stochastic environment of economic
agents can be defended on theoretical grounds <uncertainty about
the future should realistically increase with the forecast
horizon) and, on empirical grounds, cannot be refuted by the
limited time-series data available: tests on most economic data
fail to reject nonstationarity of the underlying stochastic
processes. The assumption of constant ela~ticity (loglinear)
functional forms is consistent with much empirical literature, and
allows construction of fairly complicated models of the firm:
problems with multiple state variables can be reduced to
equivalent problems with only one state variable.
Chapter 1 also shows how optimal risk taking techniques
(option valuation, optimal stopping) can be used to solve
stochastic control problems under first-order adjustment costs. As
noted above, every adjustment entails some risk of regret if there
is ongoing uncertainty, and optimal stopping techniques indicate
how such risky decisions should be taken.
The following two Chapters apply the control technique to
economically interesting problems.
Chapter 2 studies the dynamics of irreversible capital
accumulation r and the implications of irreversibility for
empirical studies of investment: the assumption that the scrap
value of capital be negligible is certainly realistic at the
macroeconomic level, since production facilities have no direct
consumption value; and is a very close approximation for an
individual firm's problem, since capital equipment is usually
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specific to a firm's needs and has little (if any) resale value.
The investment rule has a clossd form under the assumption that
the cost of adjusting capital use downward be prohibitive, and has
intuitive comparative statics properties: firms will be more
reluctant to invest if their environment is very uncertain. The
implications of optimal irreversible investment decisions for
observable quantities are also derived, and it is found (perhaps
surprisingly) that higher uncertainty implies that on average more
capital will ex-post be used if uncertainty is larger and
investment is irreversible. Firms are more reluctant to invest in
such a situation, but the impossibility of decumulating capital
builds a ratchet in the accumulation process and increases the
long-run capital intensity of production.
Chapter 2 then discusses the implications of investment
irreversibility for the behavior of observable variables such as
the value of the firm, investment and Tobin's Q: the dynamics of
all variables are non-standard, and exogenous shocks can
potentially have very long-lasting consequences. The results of
the Chapter are arguably consistent with the empirical evidence
based OIl more standard dynamic and pseudo-dynamic models of
investment. Dynamic models based on convex costs of adjustment are
mispecified if investment is irreversible in reality, and their
poor empirical performance is therefore not surprising, but it is
possible to interpreted their results under the assumption of
investment irreversibility. Quasi-static models of investment,
based on the asssumption of equality (on average) of capital's
marginal profitability to its user cost, are also mispecified if
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capital accumulation is in fact irreversible: and irreversibility
can help explain recent empirical results in this strand of
literature.
Chapter 3 (joint work with Samuel Bentolila) applies the
optimization model of Chapter 1 to dynamic labor demand in the
presence of hiring, and especially firing, costs. The European
unemployment experience has often been partly blamed on
restrictive severance pay legislation, which appears to explain
well some features of the dismal employment-creation record of
most European countries. A formal model shows that firms will
exercise more caution in their employment policies if labor-force
adjustment costs are large and the environment is highly
uncertain: the characteristics of the firm's employment policies
are also related to other parameters, notably the attrition rate
of the employed labor force and the growth rate of desired
production. The implications of high firing costs for observed
employment are also derived: it is found that the size of firing
costs scarcely affects the average level of employment in the long
run (and, via the same ratchet effect found for irreversible
capital accumulation, larger firing costs increase average
employment): but large firing costs have clear dynamic effects,
inducing sluggish adjustment of em~loyment to exogenous events.
The implications of the model are quantitatively evaluated with
r9alistic parameters valu9s for the four large European economies:
the change in firms' stochastic environment that followed the
first oil shock, and the presence of high firing costs, are found
to be by and large consistent with the observed behavior of
8
e~ployrnent in those economies, characterized by very little hiring
and firing, but large reductions in employment via labor
attrition.
9
CHAPTER 1
DYNAMIC STOCHASTIC PROGRAMMING UNDER UNEAR ADJUSTMENT COSTS
10
This Chapter discusses the solution of a class of discounted
dynamic control problems, distinguished by the fact that the cost
of adjusting endogenous state variables is linear in their
displacement - i.e., the marginal cost of adjustment does not
depend on the speed at which adjustment occurs. Problems of this
type have been studied in the Operation Research literature;
economic applications to the theory of the firm could include the
study of inventory processes, pricing in the presence of menu
costs, irreversible investment decisions, and dynamic labor
demand. Two such applications are considered in the following
Chapters, and the set of techniques proposed in this Chapters
should prove useful in future research as well.
The techniques presented below are not totally new, although
their application to economically interesting functional forms is.
The treatment privileges economic intuition over abstract
technical rigor: the thought experiments (feasible perturbations)
underlying optimality conditions are described in economic terms,
and the equivalence among the different approaches should
eventually become clear to economically minded readers.
Section 1 presents the general form of the problem under
study: Section 2 proves necessity of an economically intuitive
first order condition for optimality of a control policy, based on
a feasible perturbation argument. Section 3 proves that the
problem under study can sometimes yield "myopic" policy rules, and
refers the reader to previous work by Arrow[1968] and
Nickell[1974]. Section 4 specializes to functional forms that
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allow explicit solution of the problem under uncertainty, and
derives the solution making use of the necessary conditions
discussed in Section 2. Section 5 proposes an alternative approach
to the same problem, based on optimal stopping rather than on the
feasible perturbation argument, and uses this result to prove
existence of the solution. Section 6 discusses the characteristics
of the solution and reviews related Operations Research literature
on similar control problems.
1 - Statement of the problem
Consider the optimization problem of a firm (or some more
general economic entity, for example Robinson Crusoe or the social
planner whose optimal plan is mimicked by a competitive market)
that tries to maximize a time-separable objective function. The
discount factor is constant and equal to r, but instantaneous
payoffs depend on exogenous factors Wt (the state of the affairs),
whose probability law the firm knows and takes as given, and on
endogenous state variables Kt which the firm can manipulate. For
simplicity, Kt is assumed to be a scalar. To obtain an interesting
problem, we assume that manipulating Kt is costly, and we ask what
is the firm's optimal adjustment policy.
In order to state the firm's problem formally, some terms are
used whose (rough) definition follows: a a-field is a partition of
the states of nature ~, which are eleJ,ents of the sample space 0;
statements that are made "almost surely" are true in all states of
the world ~, except that they can be false for a set of ~s (an
event) which has zero probability measure. If there is no memory
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loss, observation over time of a stochastic process (a function of
time and of the state of nature ~) generates a finer and finer
sequence of a-fields, i.e. provides ever more detailed information
about the true state of the world; a probability law assigns
probability measure to all sets (events) of the partition; and a
random variable X is said to be Uadapted" to a a-field if
observation of XiS realization does not provide information
further to that provided by the a-field (jf the a-field is
generated by a stochastic process, the adapted random variable X
is "non-anticipat.ory" wi th respect to that stochastic process).
PROBLEM
Given:
- the probability law P for exogenous forcing factors
(WT;OSTsool, and the sequence of a-fields r
T
generated by {WS;SST};
W is a possibly vector-valued stochastic process, i.e. a function
+ nW(~/T) :00~ ~ that maps every state of nature in w into a
complete sample path for the exogenous variables; we assume that
sample paths are right-continuous.
- the functional form of instantaneous payoffs n{Kt,W t );
- a given instantaneous discount rate r;
- the adjustment cost f[dXT,WT) for each unit displacement of
the endogenous state variable; f(.,.) is assumed to have the
following form:
P(WT ) , if x ) 0
[1.1] f(X,WT ] = 0 if x = 0
p(W
T
) , if x < a
with P(WT)~P(WT) almost surely for all T;
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- the spontaneous dynamics of the endogenous state variable,
given by
[1.2] dKt = -OKtdt + Xt for all t
where 6 is an exponential depreciation rate, assumed constant for
simplicity;
*~olve for the value function V and the associated optimal
feedback control process {KT : KT adapted to 7 T , t~T~T), defined by
[1.3]
where
is the value function, and the conditional (on the information
available at time t) expectation, Et{.. }=J .. dP(~;7t)' is taken
over the joint probability distribution of exogenous variables
{Wt } and endogenous variables {Kt }.
Some remarks on the characteristics of the problem considered
are in order. Since the problem in described in continuous time,
the firm can continuously monitor the state of affairs and act
accordingly; as it is often the case, this turns out to simplify
the solution. Note however that the degenerate stochastic process
(calendar time) XT=T a.s. could well be one of the elements of W,
and the adjustment cost function could then be specified so as to
prevent adjustment at non-integer values of T, for example, or on
Sunday.
Given the assumed form of the adjustment cost function,
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larger displacements of K incur constant marginal adjustment
costs; ttlis produces solutions wi th "bang-bang" character: if
adjustment is undertaken, the speed of adjustment can be
infinitely large, so that the paths of the endogenous variable K
fail to be differentiable functions of time (K "can jump"). The
firm need not continuously adjust the factors that are costly to
move, and can instantaneously displace them by a finite amount
when it does act. Since X
T
can fail to be differentiable, the
second integral in [1.3] is to be interpreted as a Stiltjes
integral, with integrating function dXT=XT+-XT _- If the adjustment
costs were strictly convex, then the sample paths of {X,) would be
differentiable, i.e. dXT=xTd T where x, is the rate of control per
unit time.
Note from the form of the first integral above that the
instantaneous payoff n(.,.) is instead restricted to be a flow:
apart from discounti~g, additions to total revenue are n(Kt,Wt)dt
in a small time interval dt. In other words, the problem is
restricted by the assumption that total undiscounted revenues TI=
Jdll can be written as In<t}dt, or that the cumulation of revenues
is differentiable with respect to time. Nondifferentiability of
the total revenue function n would realistically arise if the firm
only sold its product and/or paid variable costs at distinct, and
possibly random, times. This is ruled out in [1.3] for simplicity.
Note that, for now, it is assumed that the problem in [1] is
well defined, i.e. that the integrals and the expectations exist.
This needs to be verified for individual applications: further
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restrictions will be specified in what follows as necessary.
2 - Characterization of the optimal path
It is possible to characterize the optimal path to some
extent (if it exists) without actually solving the problem [2] -
in fact, without finding the value function.
A further assumption is necessary:
Assumption The instantaneous payoff function is twice
differentiable, increasing and strictly concave in the endogenous
state variables:
for all t, almost surely;
a Kt
2a n(Kt,Wt ) < 0 , for all t, almost surely;
a K 2
t
Under these conditions, the following is true:
Proposition 1 (Feasible perturbation)
If the firm adopts the optimal control rule, then whenever control
is taking place the following is true (almost surely):
[2.1]
And when no control is taking place, it must almost surely be the
case that
[2.2] -(r+
O) (T-t) on(K W) }
e T' T dT
OKT
In other words, the conditions in [2.1] and [2.2] are
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necessary for optimality of the firm's policy.
PROOF: By assumption, the firm is following the optimal dynamic
*program: let {KT ; O~T~TI be the stochastic process for the
endogenous variables corresponding to the optimal feedback rule.
"'"We now prove that [2.1,2.2] must almost surely be satisfied by {KT
: O~TSOOJ, or else the value function would not be attaining the
maximum. Let A be a subset of 0, with p(A»O, such that neither
[2.1] nor [2.2] are satisfied at some T<OO if ~A; note that AEYT ,
i.e. it is known at time T whether or not the true state of the
world is in A ("A occurs"), since all expressions in [2.1] and
[2.2] are observable at T. It is then legitimate to perturb the
*original investment policy (dXt } by a small amount A at time T if
A occurs, without otherwise m~difying the feedback rule (so that
the amount of control for the endogenous variables is the original
one for every time except T and every state of the world except
* ~
all ~A: dXT=dXT+A if A occurs, and dXT=dXT almost surely for T-T.
Note that the new policy is legitimate in that it is still adapted
to r t , i.e. depends on an event that is known when the
perturbation occurs). By integrating equation [1.2] above, if
(K ;OSTSOO) are the endogenous variable paths for the perturbed
T
*policy and (KTiOSTSOOJ are the paths corresponding to the optimal
policy, the perturbed policy under consideration are such that for
*OSTsT K =K almost surely, and for TSTSOOT T
,. *
occurs, KT=KT otherwise.
As long as all integrals and expectations are well defined,
we can exploit their linearity and additivity properties to write,
for any tST,
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- *[2.3] V(Kt,Wt ) - v (Kt,Wt ) =
T
{J -r(T-t) ( ] }= Et e In(K~ ,wT>-n(KT,wT> dT +
t
<D
Je-r<T-t)J -r(T-T) [ -0 (T-T) ]= e U(K: + Ae ,W >-niK*,w > dT.. T T T
A T
> Je-r(T-t) [J
A T
-r(T-T}
e
=Je-r(T-t) [J{J
A A T
-r(T-T)
e
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The inequality above follows from the assumed strict
concavity of n(.,.) in its first argument, and the last equality
uses 't£7T for tST (the law of iterated expectations).
It is now possible to show that A can be chosen to obtain
*V(Kt,Wt ) ) V (Kt,W t ) if the probability is not zero that neither
[2.1] nor [2.2] will be true at some finite time.
*Suppose first that dXT-O but, if A occurs, then
[2.1']
-(r+o) (T-t) on(K W) }
e " T dT
oK
T
= -~ 74 0
contradicting [2.1]; note that, since by assumption it is known at
T that the true state of the world is in A, P(W;;T)=O for ~€{Q\A}
(the complement of A) and therefore
-(r+o) (T-t) on(K ,W )
e T T
8K
T
=J J
Q T
=J J
A T
- (r+o) (T-t) on (K , W )
e T T dT dp(~;'T)
oK
'T
19
.,
Choose a A with the same sign as ~ and smaller in absolute
*value than dXT , so that (recalling the definition of f(.,.)
above) f(dX;+A,WT]=f(dX;,WT]. This choice for A yields, after
insertion of [2.1'] into [2.3],
[2.4] V(K W) V*(K W) Je-r(T-t)A ~ dp(n'·~t)t' t - t' t ) II ~ ~ r
A
But the right hand side of [2.4] is strictly positive if A
has positive probability, which contradicts the assumed optimality
*of the feedback rule which produces {K
T
}.
Suppose instead that dXit=O but [2.2] fails, for example
T
{J -(r+o) (T-t) 8n(K W) }[2.1'] p(Wt ) - Et e T' T dT = ~ < 0
t OKT
Then set A<O and obtain from [2.3] the inequality
* J -r(T-t)V(Kt,Wt ) - V (Kt,W t » e A ~ dp(~;7t) >0
A
If it is the second inequality in [2.2] to fail, then
choosing a positive A will yield a similar inequality.
We conclude that any failure of [2.1,2.2] that occurs with
positive probability implies that the firm is not following the
optimal feedback rule in its control policy, in that a feasible
feedback policy would yield a strictly larger value function.
[end of proof].
This characterization of the optimal policy rule has a
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straightforward interpretation: whenever the firm is in fact
acting, concavity of the payoff function implies that at the
margin the action does not alter the value of the policy; the
value of the last infinitesimal unit of K. installed or
1
uninstal1ed at the present time\is simply the expected, present
discounted value of the contribution to instantaneous payoffs by
the infinitesimal unit that will 'be marginal at all future times
\
i(the shadow price of K). If the firm is not acting, that expected,
,
present discounted value is (weaklr) less than the certain,
t
\
immediate cost of adjustment.
The firm should then, when de~iding about the amount of
control to be applied at the present time, view the currently
marginal unit as the marginal one t~roughout the planning horizon,
and take future investment decision~ as given in probability
distribution. The very fact that con~itions [2.1] and [2.2] will
be satisfied at all future times then defines the optimal control
policy.
This can be interpreted as an i~plication of the envelope
theorem: the firm is justified in ta~ing future control as given
when deciding on the amount of control to be applied today,
because any effect of today's control on future value has to occur
through a modification of future investment decisions; ~ut these
are assumed to be optimal, hence at the margin a small change in
future control has no effect on the value function.
It should be noted that this characterization can be obtained
imposing very little structure on the problem. Apart from the
assumptions of linearity of the adjustment cost function and of
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concavity of the payoff function, it is only assumed that policies
are non-anticipative with respect to the exogenous variables, that
all the integrals and expect~t~~ns are well-defined and therefore
have the usual linearity and additivity properties. Once again,
exist~nce of the value function needs to be verified for specific
applications.
3 - Myopic policy rules
Recall that it has been assumed above that the exogenous
variables {WtJ have right-continuous sample paths. An additional
assumption will guarantee that p(.), P(.), n(K,.) and an(K,.)/oK
have right-continuous sample paths as well:
Assumption: peW), pew) and n(K,W) are continuously differentiable
in w.
This, together with the characterization obtained above for
the optimal control rule, suffice to obtain an important result:
Proposition 2 (Euler equation)a) If an optimal feedback rule
exists, and dXT-O for TE[t1 ,t2 ) I t 1 <t2 (i.e.control of the
endogenous variable takes place with probability one between t 1
and t
2
), then
[3.1]
on(K ,W )T T
oK
T
PROOF: Since control occurs continuously in [t1 ,t2 ), we have from
Proposition 1 that
22
-(r+5) Cr-t) Q1l(K ,W )
e T T
8K
T
almost surely for t E [t1 ,t2 >
For a fixed w, consider the path-by-path differential of the
two sides of equation [3.2] with respect to t (the differential is
well defined since W - and therefore K - have right-continuous
sample paths) to obtain:
[3 .3] df (dX (c.> , t) , W(c.> , t) ] = 8n(K(Q,t) ,W(~,t» dt
aK(CA>,~-)
- (r+0) (T - t ) ](r+5) e Qn(K(c.>,T),W(c.>,T» dT dt
OK((,),T)
which is true for all t E [t1 ,t2 ) and all ~E{Q\AJ, where A is any
subset of 0 such that p(A)=O.
Now integrate both sides of [3.3] over 0 with respect to
P(~:7t)' noting that any ~ such for which [3.3] is not satisfied
belongs to sets that receive zero weight in the integration, and
that Kt and Wt are known at time t so that integration over states
af nature of the first term on the right-hand side of [3.3]
returns its actual value:
[3.4]
23
+ (r+6)
- ( r +0) (T - t ) a11 (K W) }
e T' T dT
oK
T
from which the assertion follows noting from equation [3.2] that
the last term is e~ (r+~~~Xt,Wt}~.~--------------~
[end of proof]
Proposition 2 states the conditions necessary for the firm to
temporarily base its control policy only on current events,
without looking forward and with no need to take the endogenous
variable's process into account. Note that the proof does not go
through as soon as there is any probability that it will be
optimal to abstain from control in the next instant. In
particular, of course, there is no presumption that a condition
like [3.1] should hold when the firm is abstaining from control,
i.e. when dX=O.
The economic interpretation of [3.1] is straightforward: if
control is certainly occurring throughout [t1 ,t2 ), then it must be
distributed along that interval in such a way that [3.1] is true.
Otherwise, a reallocation of control would increase the value of
the firm: in other words, a version of the Euler equation would be
violated.
Arrow[1967] and Nickell[1974] used the equivalent of [3.1] to
characterize investment under linear adjustment costs, assuming
that the exogenous variables in W follow piecewise continuous
paths, about which the firm has no uncertainty: then when
24
investment occurs, it occurs continuously over an interval, and
consi~eration of [3.1] is sufficient to solve for the path of the
endogenous variable K. Control (investment) will stop and resume
at points in time where
[3.1']
an (K , W )
'r T
oK
T
dT
a~d knowledge of the exogenous variables' path will suffice to
construct the optimal investment policy: Arrow and Nickell provide
algorithms for this purpose, and show that iI1 general investment
will stop before a cyclical peak is attained and resume after the
cyclical trough.
If control is certain to occur at all times, i.e. the
equations in [2.1] always hold with equality, then [3.1] is always
true and the firm can follow a "myopic" policy rule, varying the
endogenous factor K so as to equate its current marginal payoff to
the current value of the right-hand side of [3.1]. A sufficient
condition for this to be the case is that PCWT)=P(WT ) for all T,
almost surely: then [2.1] and [2.2] collapse to the single
equation
[3.5] , all t
In such a situation, of course, the firm does not need to
solve a truly dynamic problem: use of Kt can be varied
continuously to satisfy [3.1], whose right-hand side is the so
25
called liI user cost of capital" (see Jorgenson[1963]) if K is the
installed capital stock.
4 - A class of solvable-problems
Consider the following specialization of the general problem
described in [1] and [2] above:
{Wtl={Wzt,Wptl is taken to be a two-dimensional Brownian
motion process, i.e. each state of the world ~ is associated with
constant elasticitya
two continuous sample paths wi th increments (W,." -w ,." ,W 'Y -w 'Y ;
z.2 z~1 p.2 p.1
T2)T1} which are independent of fW
Z
'Tl'WpT2 } and have a bivariate
normal distribution given the information available at Tl:
1
[4.1] W(Kt,Zt) = 1+8 K~+8 Zt' -1<8<0,
function of the endogenous and exogenous state variables, with
[4.2] dZ t = ~z Ztdt + Zt U z dWzt ' a univariate geometric Brownian
motion process:
P t follows a geometric Brownian motion with stochastic
differential
where dWpt is the increment of
another standard Wiener process with correlation p to dW
zt ;
[4.5] P t = ~ P t , ~ constant, Asl to satisfy the assumption that
ptSPt always.
The problem data are ~, ~ I ~ I U I 0 , P, A, 0 and r: all
z p z p
these are assumed to be constant over time.
Note that geometric Brownian motion processes are
particularly convenient since their Markov state space is
completely described by their level alone; and assuming a
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constant-elasticity functional form for the instantaneous payoff
facilitates solution because constant-elasticity functions of
geometric Brownian motion follow geometric Brownian motion.
The restriction -1<8<0 makes Proposition 1 in the previous
section applicable: we then seek a non-anticipative control rule
that satisfies [2.1] and [2.2] at all times: i.e., the optimal
control rule must specify a nonanticipating control process (X t )
such that
[4.6]
- (r+o) (T-t) 13
e KT ZT
(J)
rr - (r+0) (-r - t ) {3 }
[4.~] E
tLJ
e K-r Z-r d-r = P t if dXt<O
t
With the assumptions made above, it is reasonable to guess
that the optimal control process 'will have the following form: the
endogenous variable should be displaced only as necessary to
obtain
[4.9] or equivalently
where the boundaries a and ~ are constants to be determined. Such
a control rule is obviously nonanticipating, since it only depends
on current values of the exogenous variables, which in turn have
continuous sample paths.
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To verify that the control rule has the form [4.9], and to
find the optimal control barriers ~ and a, it is now necessary to
compute the expectations of di~counted marginal payoff streams
appearing in [4.6]-[4.8].
The problem at hand is to find an expression for the
conditional expectation appearing in [4.6]-[4.8]; the conditional
expectation will, of course, be a function of the current value of
the state variables and of the parameters 0, r, a, .e, {t I {t , a I
p Z
a p ' n. Define a new variable n t = K~ Zt' and define a functional
expression for the conditional expectation:
(I)
[4.10] f(nt,p t ; 0, r, {I" t ....J = Et{I nT e-(r+~> (T-t>dT }
t
Of course, the control rule in [4.9] has to be taken into
account when computing the conditional expectation in [4.10]: the
process followed by (ijt) under the control rule needs to be
determined.
Now note that when control is not enacted, i.e. dX t is zero,
then dKt =-6 dt, and the derivative of the payoff function with
respect to K follows a geometric Brownian motion, being a constant
f3
elasticity function of geometric processes; define ~t = {Kt Zt;
dXt=Ol, and use Ito's lemma to find its stochastic differential:
a~ a~t 1 [a2~t [ ]2[4.11] d~t = t dK + ---- dZ + - ---- dKt +oK t aZ t 2 8K 2
t t t
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where ~= -6B + ~ .
z
If a control policy of the form [4.9] is adopted, the firm
will prevent {~tJ from ever being larger than a P t or smaller than
~ Pt=~~Pt; the derivative of the payoff function with respect to K
than follows a regulated geometric Brownian motion, with moving
control barriers at a Pt and l A Pt : i.e. the stochastic process
Inti is defined by
[4.12] nt =
where:
(i) {~t} is a geometric Brownian motion process, with stochastic
differential
d~t = ~t P dt + ~t GzdWzt
and initial condition ~O:
(ii) {UtI and {L t } are increasing and continuous processes, with
L =u =1:o 0
(iii) {LtJ only increases when q~=i~Pt' and {UtI only increases
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when ijt=ap t , where a and ~ are given positive real numbers and Pt
follows a geometric Brownian motion, with stochastic differential
dPt=~pPt dt + Pt a p dWpt ' dWztdWpt=pazap
and initial condition PO' such that ~APO $ ~O $ aPO~
(iv) ! S ijt s a for all t~O
These four properties uniquely identify (Uti and (Ltl: these
two processes maintain ijt within. the moving barriers us~ng the
minimum amount of control, since they only increase when ijt it at
the frontiers of the region el,a]. Proposition (6), page 22 in
Harrison[19851 proves uniqueness formally for the case of a
regulated linear Brownian motion process, and it is easy to adapt
the proof to the present case of a regulated geometric Brownian
motion process: note that (71t /P t) is a geometric Brownian motion
process regulated between Al and a, implying that fln(ijt/Pt)} is a
linear Brownian motion process regulated between In(A~) and In(a) I
and apply Harrison's proof of uniqueness.
It is now possible to compute the expectations of discounted
marginal profitability streams appearing in equations [4.6]-[4.8],
as a function of the yet to be determined control points t and a,
and of the problem data.
First note that {UtI and (Ltl are processes of finite
variation, since they never decrease: this means that
2 2(dUt ) =(dLt ) =(dUtdLt)=(dUtd~t)=(dLtd~t)=O.
These relations imply that if we apply Ito's lemma to ~t'
which is a continuously differentiable function of ~t' Ut and Lt ,
all the second order terms vanish to yield:
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L ~~ d~ + _t dL
U t U t
t t
L L ~t dL t ~t L t dUt
_t ~t IJ dt + __t G dW t + Lt -- - --U t u Z Z Ut L t Ut Utt
= T1 t lJ dt + 71tC7zdWzt + 71 t
dL t dUt
- - T1 --
L t Utt
Now consider the conditional expectation defined in [4.10],
f(71 t ,Pt) (the dependence of the function on the time-invariant
parameters r, 6, at l ... is suppressed in what follows for
typographical convenience); assume that it is a continuously
differentiable function of ~t and Pt , and apply Ito's lemma again
to obtain (subscripts denote partial derivatives):
where the fact that dL~O only if ~t=~~Pt' and similarly dUt~O
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only if ~t=aPt' is used in obtaining the last equality.
Now recall the Integration By Parts formula found in
Harrison[1985], page 73: if fYt } is an Ito process (i.e. the
stochastic integral IdYt is well defined) and (Xtl is a continuous
process with finite variation, then
lJ lJ
YvXv = YtXt + IYTdXT + IXTdYT
o 0
Apply the Integration by Parts formula to Y
v
= f(nv'p v ) and
x
v
=e-(r+5) (v-t) , which always decreases and therefore has finite
-(r+6) (T-t) (r+O) (T-t)
variation; using dee ] = -(r+O)e dT, and
df(~T,PT) from [4.14], one obtains, after rearranging terms,
[4.15] -(r+o)v f ( P) =e l1 v ' v
v
+Ie-(r+o) (T-t) [f1 (71T ,PT)71TP + f2(71T,PT)i}PPT+ : f u (71 T,PT)a:71;+
t
1
2 f22(71T,PT)a;p~ + f1~(71T,PT)71TPTpazap- (r+O) f(71 T,PT) ] dT +
I f1(A~T,PT) A~PT d~: + I f2(71T,PT)PTO'pdWpT
t T
For the investment rule to be well defined it must be the
case that f(.,.) and its derivatives are always finite; this
implies that
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and, for all v ~ t,
v v
Et { If1 (ijT'PT) ijTCzdWZT } = Et { I f2(ijT,PT)PTCpdWpT} = 0
t t
because the expectation of the integral of a bounded function
against a Wiener process is always zero (see, for example,
Proposition 4.3.7 in Harrison[1985]: this is due to the erratic
behavior of the Wiener process, whose increments after time tare
completely unpredictable, by definition, on the basis of the
information available at t).
Then, let V~ and take the conditional expectation of [4.15]
at t to obtain
[4.16] 0 = e-{r+6) (T-t) [f (TJ P)71 J.l +1 T' T T
1
f 22 (ijT'PT)C;P; + f(ijT'PT) ) dT } +£12 (77 T ' P T) 77 T P T pazap - (r+o)2
(J) 00
Et { I £1 (aPT,PT ) aPT
dUT
I
f 1 (A..lpT'PT ) A.lPT
dLT }-- -UT LT
t t
Recall, from [4.10], that
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- (r+O) (T-t) d }T1 e T •
T '
In light of [4.16], this can be true only if on the one hand
for all nand P such that Als(ij/p)~a , and, on the other hand, the
last expectation in [4.16] vanishes: this requir~s that
[4.18] f (ap,p)ap = f (Alp,P) Alp = 0 for all P1 1
We conclude that, in general, the conditional expectation
f(ijt'P t ) is defined by the functional equation [4.17] with
boundary conditions [4.18].
The general form of the solution to [4.17] is a linear
combination of power functions and of a linear term,
Imposing the boundary conditions [4.18] on the functional
form in [4.20] we find:
These conditions must be satisfied for all p~O, which
requires that
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[4.22] ~1=1-al, ~2=1-~
[4.23] 0.2-1. 0a =,
In light of [4.22], we can rewrite [4.20] as
and proceed to compute the partial derivatives of this function to
find that, for [4.17] to be satisfied,
1
81-
r+6-IJ
and at, a2 must be solutions of
2
o
[4.25] -
2
222
where 0 E a + a - 2po a > 0
z p z p
The quadratic equation [4.25] has two real roots of opposite
sign provided that r+6-~ >0· let cu be the positive root and Q2 bep ,
the negative root:
a1 -
a2-
~(J
) 0
< 0
1 1 0 2 1+~
Note, for use below, that r > -~ -+ ~ (1 +-) + - implies
za p 8 2 ~2
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that -Bcu)l, as can be verified noting that -Bat is the positive
solution to the quadratic equ3tion
[4.26]
2
o 2 1 1 0 2 1
X - (it - +6 -ft - - - -] X - (r+o--'p] = 0
z 8 p 8 2 B
[4.28] A.f s
The only parameters as yet unsolved for in [4.24] are B2 and
B3 : but insertion of B1= (r+b-p)-1 in [4.23] yields a system of
two linear equations in B2 and B3 , with solution
1 a a2 "Al _ a (A.f)a2
[4.27] B2 = r+o-IJ al (aal (:\.f) a2 aa2 (:\.f) al]
«(Al)a! a11 - a ;\,-l
B3 =
r+o-11 a2 (aal (:\.f) a2 aa2 (:\.e) a1 ]
This completes the derivation of
(J)
8 _ {J -(r+0) (T- t ) {3 }
f(KtZt,P t : a, l ... ) ; Et e KT ZT dT
t
under the assumption that the firm adopts a control rule that
obtains
13
Kt Zt
P t
using the minimum amount of control: control dXt is applied to Kt
only when one of the weak inequalities in [4.28] holds with
equality.
To find which constants u and .e characterize the optimal
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f3
control policy, W3 insert f(KtZt,P t : a, l ... ) into the necessary
conditions [4.6]-[4.8]:
[4.6'] f (:\4't' p t a, .e ...J = :\.p (dXt<O .. K~Zt=.f:\pt)t
[4.8'] f ( upt' Pt a, .e ·..J Pt (dXt>O B= .. Ktzt=aP t )
Using [4.24], these conditions read
[ 4.6"] B;t-lp B (A.4' ) a1 p l-al+ B (A.lp )a2p l-a.2 =1 t+ 2 t t 3 t t
P t can be eliminated from these equations; then, insertion of
the expressions found above for B1 , B2 , B3 , and some
simplification, yields:
These two equations are highly nonlinear in u and l, but can
be easily solved numerically. Although it does not seem possible
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to prove analytically the uniqueness of their solution, numerical
procedures are not at all sensitive to the starting point of the
iteration, suggesting that the solution is indeed unique.
Closed-form solutions can be found for special cases: if A=l
then the two equations have the same form, and cannot be solved
for distinct « and ~. But with ~=1 [4.6] and [4.8] are infact the
same equation, implying that «=~; then rOff (K t ,Zt)/8Kt ]/Pt is
constant, and simple integration on [4.6] or [4.8] shows that the
solution to the optimal control problem simply equates the current
marginal contribution of K to the payoffs to the current "user
cost" of K, (r-~p+5)Pt' confirming that when Pt=Pt for all t the
firm will continuously exercise control (see the discussion after
Proposition 2 above).
If ~=O then it is clear that dXt is never negative ([4.8]
never applies) since [8n(K t 'Zt)/8K t ])O always for K>O: this is the
case of irreversible accumulation of K. The firm only exercises
positive control, and K only decreases via depreciation.
Given that ~O, it is possible to find a closed-form solution
for a. The requirement that f(.,.) be bounded imposes that B3=O in
[4.20] above, since in the absence of negative control ijt can
become arbitrarily close to zero; the boundary condition then
provides a closed-form solution for a. The derivation of the
solution proceeds along the lines discussed above, .. and is no~
reported to save space; the form of a for the case of irreversible
control is reported in the next Chapter (see [R]).
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The next section uses an alternative approach to the solution
of the control problem, and finds a sufficient condition for
existence of a solution (finiteness of the value function).
5 - An alternative approach to the solution:
Marginal Option Pricing
The dynamic program defined in [4.1] above can be decomposed
in a sequence of optimal stopping problems: rather than deciding
how much control should be exercised at any given time, the firm
should decide when each infinitesimal particle of K should be
installed. This approach to the problem (which was first proposed
by Pindyck[1986]) uses more familiar mathematics than the approach
used in the previous section, but is based on somewhat less
economically intuitive thought experiments.
When deciding about the optimal timing for installation of
the KLh marginal unit of capital, the optimal stopping problem
facing the firm is in the form considered by McDonald and
Siegel[1986] for the case of ~=O (no resale possibility) and
extended by Dixit[1987l to the case in which the decision can be
reverted.
The general form of the optimal stopping problem considered
by these authors is as follows: an asset with value v can be
purchased at price P, if not purchased yet, or sold at price p, if
already purchased. McDonald and Siegel assume that both the value
39
of the asset v and the purchase price P are uncertain, and follow
geometric Brownian motion: but they impose that no resale be
possible, so that the exchange of the option for the asset is an
irreversible decision. They note that the value of the asset could
simply be equal to the present value, appropriately discounted, of
the dividends it will provide to its owner (but not, of course, to
the holder of the option): the asset must produce dividends, or it
would never be profitable to buy it since it cannot be resold.
Dixit, on the other hand, considers the case of reversible
decisions but restricts P and p to be both fixed (nonstochastic).
In this section the optimal stopping technique is applied to
the decision to install or uninstall the currently marginal unit
of K: it will be shown that the firm's problem can be reduced to a
sequence of stopping problems of the form outlined above.
Consider that at any time, given that the total installed
stock of the endogenous variable is K, installation or
uninstal1ation of an additional (K~h) infinitesimal unit of
capital is possible; installation will produce a stream of
marginal payoffs whose expectation is easy to compute, because it
only depends on the exogenous probability law of Z.
Define the "dividend" provided by installed marginal units of
K (its marginal contribution to the payoff) as
[5.1]
for each K, KE[O,OO).
The next ta~k is computing the "value" of the Kth installed
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unit, i.e. the expectation of the stream of marginal payoffs it
will produce. The presence of depreciation introduces some
complications: note that installation of the Kth unit at time t
· th -t 1 t k t future tl.-me ~ by only e-O(T-t)1ncreases e capl. a 5 oc a any ~
< 1 units, since the unit steadily depreciates at rate 0; then
note that the total capital stock also depreciates at rate 6, and
therefore the depreciation rate appears twice in the expression
for the additional payoff produced by installation of the marginal
unit of the endogenous factor when the current stock is K:
[5.2]
(I)
V(K,Zt) = Et{J
-r(T-t)
-0 (T- t) ( -0 (T- t )J13
dT}e e Ke ZT =
t
(J)
J
-(r+O) (T-t) ( -0 (T-t»)13
Et{ZT}dT= e Ke =
t
(I)
=J
- (r+O) (T- t) [ -0 (T- t ) ] 13 {} (T-t)
z
e Ke Z e d't" =t
t
K{3 Z
t
=
r+O-(-' -6(3)
z
TIt
=
r+o-(-' -013)
z
The firm holds the right to pay Pt and acquire, at any time,
the currently marginal unit of K, and forever receive the stream
of marginal payoffs whose discounted expectation is given in
[5.2], reaardless of future control of the endogenous stock; on
the other hand, the firm can always sell the marginal unit of
capital, receiving APt but giving up the stream of marginal
payoffs those units would have produced if left in place.
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If the firm does not purchase the Kt..h unit, a "dividend" is
given up: uninstalled units do not produce, and payoffs are lower.
But if the right to install the Kt..h unit is exercised, the
firm gives up the option to wait and learn information about the
evolution of rZ t } and {PtJ: it is often the case, of course, that
installation turns out to be a bad idea ex-post, because Zt or P t
fall; conversely, uninstallation can turn out to have been a bad
idea if Zt or APt rise. This defines an optimal stopping problem
for the decision to install the currently marginal unit: the firm
has to trade off the foregone dividends and the risk of acting too
soon.
The value of the marginal unit available for installation at
time t has, given that the already installed capital stock Kt is
depreciating at rate -8, dynamics given by Ito's lemma as
13d(Kt Zt)
r+o-(" -0(3)
z
=
=
By the assumptions at the beginning of section 5, the
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purchase price of K follows the dynamics given in [4.4] above:
dP t = Pt~pdt + Pt 0pdWpt
and the resale price of K follows:
dAP t = APt~ dt + AP a dWp t p pt
Therefore, the value of the marginal unit in place, its
purchase cost and its resale price follow geometric Brownian
motion processes; the correlation between the increments of the
first process and the increments of the latter two processes is P,
while the purchase cost and the resale price have perfectly
correlated increments.
Now define a marainal option valuation problem: at any given
time, the firm can exercise the call option to purchase, at price
P t , a package containing the currently marginal unit of K and a
put option to sell it at price APt; alternatively, the firm can
exercise the put option to sell, at price APt' the package
containing the currently marginal unit of K and the call option to
install the next unit of K.
Clearly, the value of the two options must, for given K,
depend on the current values of ~t and Pt , which completely
describe the state of the system; denote F(ijt'P t ) the value of the
call option, and f(ijt'P t ) the value of the put option. Ito's lemma
gives the dynamics followed by the two options when "alive" (not
yet exercised). The expected rate of return on any unexercised
option must then, by arbitrage, be such that the their holder
earns the required rate of return: here, again, the presence of
depreciation introduces some complications. The required rate of
return on assets is r in the problem considered in Section 5:
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since the value of the firm is the expected flow of cash-flow
discounted at rate r, the opportunity cost of funds for the firm
is equal to r. But unexercised options to install or uninstall
units of K should instead earn a rate of return equal to r+o: when
such options go unexercised capital depreciates at rate 0, and the
index K of the currently marginal unit steadily decreases. The
optimal stopping problem is defined on a "moving target": the
asset that can be purchased (the marginal option) changes
continuously, a~ capital depreciates.
Imposing then that unexercised options earn an expected rate
of return equal to (r+6 ) , the following functional equations are
obtained for the value of the two options when alive:
(r+O ) f (11, P) = 0
1 1
[5.4] F1 (71,P)71Jl + F2(71,P)~pP + - Fu (71,P)O:71 2 + - F22 (71,P)O;p 2 -2 2
( r+O) F (11 , P ) = 0
where subscripts denote partial derivatives.
The solution of these ordinary differential equations must
satisfy the following boundary conditions:
F(O,P)=O for P>O, because the option that gives its holder
the right to purchase the asset with value ~/(r+o(l+~)-~~) must be
worthless when ~=O forever and the exercise price is positive (0
is an absorbing state for" geometric Brownian motion process);
f(x,P)~ as x~ if P(OO, for the symmetric reason that an
option to sell an asset with very large value at a finite price
must become worthless as the value approaches infinity.
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In view of the parabolic form of the functional equations, we
can guess the following functional form for the two options:
B1 T/
alp(31[5.5] F(71,P)=
with a1)O, U2<O to satisfy the boundary conditions above.
The two options will be exercised on loci in (ij,P) space that
* *are implicitly defined by a function ~ =g(P ) for the call option
and ~*=h(P*) for the call option, and satisfy the following
conditions:
* * *F(g(P ),P» + P *= g(P )/(r+6(1+B)-~ ) +
z
* *f(g(P ),P )
These condi tions simpJ.y impose that the exchanges of assets
performed at the exercise points be "fair", i.e. that the value of
options surrendered plus the exercise price be in each case equal
to the value of assets and options received.
To solve the firm's problem, we need to determine g(.) and
h(.): from the definition of ~, knowledge of g(.) and h(.) will
suffice to implement the optimal policy from the observation of
the current values of K, Z and P.
since the value of the assets to be received in exchange for
a price proportional to P is proportional to ij, it is intuitive
(and can be formally proved in the present setting adapting the
arguments of McDonald and Siegel[1986]) that the boundary loci
should be homogeneous of degree 0 in ij and P, i.e. that for some
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constants a and ~
g(p)=ap
h (P) =:\..fp
The following conditions are then obtained:
* * *[5.7] F(ap ,P ) + P *= ap /(r+6(1+fl)-~ ) +
z
* *f (uP , P )
Additional boundary equations are needed for determination of
the boundaries and of the option values: these are the so-called
"smooth pasting" or "high impact" corldi tions I which can be derived
from the fact that the exercise boundary is freely chosen by the
holder of the option to maximize the option's value.
Merton[1973 , footnote 60] proves the necessity of the smooth
pasting condition for a simpler problem (optimal exercise of an
American call option), but his arguments are easily extended to
the present setting where the exercise boundary is common to two
linked option pricing problems (one an American put, one an
American call) and the exercise price is uncertain. Merton notes
that exercise points are chosen to maximize the value of the
options: in the present setting, if extended option values F and f
are defined over the space of possible exercise loci, it is true
that
[5.8] F(~,P)=Max F(~,p,a,l)
a, .e
[5.9] f(~,P)=Max f(ij,p,a,l)
-a, .t.
Replace F and f for F and f in [5.7] and totally
differentiate with respect ~o a: similarly, replace F and f for F
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and f in [5.8] and totally differentiate with respect to l, to
obtain (subscripts denote partial derivatives):
* * *[5.10] F (.u,p , P , a,.e) p
1 =
'* * * * * *P /(r+O (l+f3)-ft
z
+ f 1 (ap ,P ,«,.e)P + f 3 (ap ,P ,a,.e)
Now note that F.=F. and f.=f. (i=1,2) by the definitions in
~ 1 1 1
[5.8] and [5.9]; and, since a and ~ maximize f and F, necessarily
*f.=F.=O (j=3,4). Simplifying P and AP. out of [5.10] and [5.11],
J J
the following additional boundary equations are obtained:
It is now easy (though tedious) to insert the functional
forms in [5.5] and [5.6] into the differential equations [5.3] and
[5.4] and the boundary conditions [5.7], [5.8], [5.12] and [5.13]
to determine the exercise points a and ~, as well as the unknown
constants B1 and B2 and the exponents cu, a2, ~1, ~2. As in
section 4, it is found that ~l=l-CU and ~2=1-a2 necessarily, to
satisfy conditions [5.12] and [5.13] for all positive prices;
replacing the partial derivatives of f{.,.) and F(.,.) into the
functional equations [5.3] and [5.4] determines that al)O and U2<O
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are the solutions to the same second-order equation found in
Section 4; boundary conditions [5.12] and ~5.13] can be used to
solve for B1 and B2 ; and, finally, [5.7] and [5.8] give, after
sUbstitution of these values for B1 and B2 , a pair of nonlinear
equations to be solved for U and t that are exactly equivalent to
[4 . 6 II ] and [4. 7 .. ] .
The marginal option pricing approach then gives the same
solution to the firm's problem as the technique proposed in
Section 4, based on the necessary conditions [2.1] and [2.2]. The
economic intuition behind [2.1] and [2.2] is probably more
straightforward than the thought experiment which underlies the
marginal option pricing technique: the reduction of the dynamic
program to a series of optimal stopping problems is awkward,
especially in the presence of depreciation. But the techniques
used in this section are probably more familiar to economists (at
least to financial economists) than the mathematics adopted in
Section 5; and extension of the model (for example to a Leontief
production function as in Pindyck[1986], or to discontinuous
processes for the forcing variables {Wt ) is probably easier if
the marginal option pricing approach is adopted than otherwise.
It is now possible to verify existence of the optimal policy,
i.e. finiteness of the value function, because an useful byproduct
of the option pricing approach is the total value of the firm:
this value must be the integral of the value of all infinitesimal
units of K, both those installed (whose value is v as given in
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13[5.2] plus the value of the options to Gell them, f(K Zt'P t ) ) and
those that the firm may decide to install in the future (whose
value of these is F(K8 Zt ,Pt) ).
The total value of the firm is then
=
(J)
+ JB1 (x8 Zt]CUp~-a1 dx = =
Kt
__Zt_ [1 1+8]Kt B(z Ja2p l-U2 [ 1r+o-(~ -08) 1+8 x + 2 t t 1+8a2
z 0
1+1302] Kt
It +
o
<D
( ] [
1 Itl +I3U l]+ B Z atp l-a1
1 t t 1+f3u1
Kt
The first two integrals in [5.14] are easily seen to be
convergent as long as -1<8<0 and a2<O. Convergence of the last
integral requires 1+8cu<O, or al)-1/8: this completes the study
of th~ control program, since the value function (and hence the
optimal policy) is shown to exist if and only if cu)-l/~.
Recalling [4.26], we have the following:
Proposition The control problem proposed at the beginning of
Section 5 has a solution if and only if
1 1 2 1+13a
r ) -It - + it (1 + -) + -
z B p B 2 B2
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This says that the value of the firm will fail to be finite
unless the expected real interest rate in terms of K, r-~ , isp
sufficiently small compared to ~ , the expected growth rate of the
z
payoffs for given K. Intuitively, when the payoff function grows
too quickly and/or the price of K falls too fast, control policies
can be devised that produce cash flows streams whose expected
value over the infinite future fails to converge when discounted
at rate r.
6 - The characteristics of the optimal control process;
Connections to the engineering literature
In the previous sections the optimal policy for the firm's
problem under linear costs of control has been found, using
techniques based on economically intuitive thought experiments. In
this section the characteristics of the control process are
discussed, and the technical literature that has studied similar
problems in the abstract is referenced.
The reader should, first of all, be reminded of the
characteristics of the Brownian motion process assumed above for
the exogenous variables in the firm's problem, (P t ) and {Zt}. The
Wiener process fW t ), or standard Brownian motion, has the
following important property: WT1 -WTO is distributed independently
of WT2-WT1 for all T2)Tl)TO. This is very convenient, because it
implies that the state of the system is completely described by
the current value of Wt , independently of past events; but if the
process has nonzero variance, this property implies that rWtJ has
infinite variation, i.e. that Brownian motion "fluctuates very
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fast" (which is the reason why (dWt )2=dt, a result repeatedly used
above): Brownian motion moves both up and down in any interval of
time, no matter how small.
It follows that the firm considered in the previous sections
has to exercise control very quickly to maintain ~t/Pt (which
would be driven by Brownian motion in the absence of control)
between the control barriers a and ~~ at all times. In fact, Xt
increases or decreases only when nt/P t is equal to one of the
control barriers, and this only happens at distinct moments in
time: control is never exercised throughout the length of any
nonempty interval [Tl,T2]. This is the reason why Proposition 2 in
Section 3 above is completely unapplicable if uncertainty is
described by functions of Brownian motion: whenever control is
exercised, it is known that control will certainly not be applied
in the next instant.
The stochastic process followed by the control process tXt}
is called "singular" in the technical literature, and corresponds
to the "local time" spent at the boundaries by the underlying
Brownian motion process (see for example Harrison[1985] or
Karatzas and Schreve[1988]): though continuous (since it is a
continuous transformation of Brownian motion, which has continuous
sample paths) it only increases or decreases on a time set which
has total measure zero, being a collection of distinct points. The
"singularity" of tXt) 's sample paths lies in the fact that, though
they are continuous, differentiable almost everywhere and with a
derivative always equal to zero, they do decrease or increase so
that P(XT2-XT1-0)>0 for all Tl(T2. At its points of increase or
51
decrease, Xt moves infinitely fast, though it never jumps: the
rate of control is infinite, making it impossible to use the
classic Hamiltonian analysis.
Optimal "singular" control problems have been extensively
studied in the engineering and operations research 1iterature1 .
The abstract "tracking" problem considered by those authors is the
following one: an operator controls the position of an object in ~
with the objective of minimizing the (possibly discounted) time
integral of a convex loss function depending on the distance
between the object and an exogenous stochastic process in
continuous time, assumed to be a function of Brownian motion;
control can be exercised to affect directly the position of the
object in IR, but is costly in both directions ("fuel" is expended
when control is exercised), or is actually prohibitively costly
when exercised in one direction (the so-called "monotone follower"
problem) .
The problem considered at the beginning of Section 4 could be
reduced in that form by the following transformation: a first-best
**policy for use of K could be defined as (K J, some function of
the exogenous processes {Zt} and {Ptl: the firm would then try and
** .
"track" {K } by varying K, but would not achieve perfect track1ng
**because {K J has infinite variation (moves up and down infinitely
lSee for example Benes et a1.[1980], Chow et a1.[1985];
Harrison[1985] reports many related results, and proposes
applications to economic problems such as inventory or cash
balances control.
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often), and a control policy with infinite variation is infinitely
costly as long as Pt>P t (the purchase price of K is strictly
larger that its resale price). If Pt=Pt then, of course, control
**is costless and the policy that continuously tracks {K } is
feasible.
**Rather than deriving an expression for {K } and invoking the
technical literature, the two approaches taken above use economic
intuition to derive the optimal control boundaries. The technical
literature does note th~ equivalence between the full-fledged
singular control problem and a sequence of optimal stopping
problems 2 , although, once again, the optimal stopping problem is
highly abstract and devoid of economic content.
The technical literature also illuminates the connection
between the "singular control" problem and the more usual
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation approach to dynamic programming,
which assumes that control 'J ~ always applied at a finite rate:
Chow et al.[1985] show how the "variational inequalities" they use
to solve the singular control problem can be derived by taking the
limit as £~o of the Bellman equation for a penalized-problern, in
which the allowable rate of control is bounded by 1/~: the
penalized problem would have a solution of the "bang-bang" type,
such that control would (continuously) be enacted at the maximum
possible rate when it does take place, on time interval of finite
size; allowing the maximum rate of control to become unbounded,
2see Karatzas and Shreve[1984,1985].
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the time intervals over which control is enacted collapse to
individual points, and the resulting control process is singular.
8- Concluding comments
This Chapter discusses at length the solution to a class of
dynamic control problems, characterized by control costs that are
linear in the displacement of the endogenous state variables. The
solution is derived from first principles, highlighting the
economic intuition underlying the mathematics; the connection to
techniques studied in the technical literature, and to previous
work by economists on factor demand policies, is made clear.
The equivalence between the dynamic programming and optimal
stopping approaches is probably of independent interest. The
latter approach is particularly appropriate in the presence of
uncertainty, because when there are first-order adjustment costs
undertaking any adjustment is a risky proposition: the path of
exogenous variables can always turn out ex-post to be such as to
render adjustment inappropriate, and reversion of the control
decisions is costly. The optimal stopping technique sets out to
minimize the risk implicit in any control decision.
The set of techniques discussed here has wide-ranging
applications in economics: linear costs of adjustment produce
non-certainty equivalence in the firm's factor demand policies,
and models of investment and of labor demand have to be revised in
the light of the results found here.
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CHAPTER 2
IRREVERSIBLE CAPITAL ACCUMULATION AND THE STLJDY OF INVESTMENT
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"Capital" is the durable factor of production. A firm's
decision about use of capital today cannot be unrelated to
decisions about use of capital yesterday or tomorrow. If it were
possible to rent capital services on a smoothly functioning spot
market, firms could continuously adjust the amount of capital used
in production, and the user cost of capita] (Jorgenson[1963])
could be used in modelling demand for capital as the wage rate is
used in modeling demand for labor.
But in reality the use of capital1 cannot always be
costlessly adjusted. To obtain an interesting and tractable
dynamic programming problem, the assump~ion has often been made
that although faster adjustment of the capital stock incurs
increasing costs, the cost of infinitesimal adjustments is zero -
in other words, capital adjustment costs are aseumed to be
strictly convex, and to achieve a minimum at some level (at zero
net investment, at zero gross investment or maybe at some "normal"
level of investment). These adjustment costs may be internal to
the firm, or external to it and due to decreasing returns in
production of investment goods.
Most models of investment assume a certain environment for
the firm, and show that the ratio of the value of the firm to the
replacement cost of its capital cost (Tobin's Q) is the only
determinant of the investment decision if the firm produces under
1 or of labor: see Chapter 3 in this thesis. Modelling the joint
determination of several factor demands under linear costs of
adjustment should have high priority in future research.
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constant returns to scale and is perfectly competitive (see for
example Hayashi[1986]). It is clear that under these assumptions
there would be no reason for individual firms to exist, in partial
equilibrium: the size of the firm is only bounded by the capital
adjustment costs. Under the same assumptions, but allowing for
uncertainty, Abel[1983,1985] provides an explicit solution to the
dynamic investment problem, making simplifying assumptions
(similar to those made below) about the form of the stochastic
process facing the firm, of the demand function and of the
production function. Lucas and Prescott[1971] and Prescott[1973]
prove existence of competitive and oligopolistic equilibria under
uncertainty and convex costs of adjustment, giving some
characterization results. If costs of adjustment are modelled as
quadratic, it is possible to obtain characterizations of the
investment process in the presence of uncertainty (see for example
Sargent[1979a]), because the Euler equation that the optimal
invesmtment rule must satisfy is linear, yielding certainty
equivalence.
The models of investment based on convex adjustment costs
have not been very successful empirically (see Abel and
Blanchard[1986], 8al1[1987]), and one explanation of their poor
performance may be the assumption of a well-behaved adjustment
cost function.
Realistically, investment in productive capital is often
irreversible. From a macroeconomic point of view, industrial
plants are next to worthless unless used in production, because
57
their direct consumption value is clearly very low. From a
microeconornic point of view, many productive facilities are
firm-specific, their reconversion to alternative uses being costly
if at all possible. Irreversibility is then potentially very
important for empirical studies of investment behavior.
Moreover, investment irreversibility can provide insights for
the theoretical and empirical treatment of aggregate prices,
production and employment: the dynamic behavior of these variables
will be non-standard if investment decisions are irreversible,
because firms will sometimes find themselves stuck with a Jarger
capital stock than the desired one. Ex-post, the cost of installed
capital is sunk; positive shocks can have very long lasting
consequences if they induce firms to invest and the capital stock
can then only be reduced by depreciation. In an open economy this
is probably relevant to some degree for the medium and long run
effects of exchange rate shocks~ On the other hand investment will
occur in spurts, when costs and prices are favorable enough for
firms to exercise their option to invest; such a nonlinear
investment function is very different from the one assumed in the
standard multiplier-accelerator models, and could give firm
theoretical foundations to Hicksian trade cycle theory.
Arrow [1968], Nickell [1974] and others have studied
irreversible investment decisions in a partial equilibrium,
2see Baldwin and Krugman [1986]· for a seminal treatment of these
issues, and Dixit[1987] for a more sophisticated treatment.
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dynamic optimization framework, assuming however that firms hold
certain expectations about the cyclical path of exogenous
variables. The same certainty equivalence assumption underlies. the
(mostly empirical) literature on "putty-clay" models of
investment, which assume that not only machine tools have no value
unless used in production but the labor requirement of existing
machines is fixed (see for example Ando et al. [1974]).
Sargent [1979b] developed a simple general equilibrium model of
irreversible capital accumulation, adopting a framework similar to
the one in Lucas and Prescctt[1971] and obtaining mostly
qualitative results.
Irreversible investment under uncertainty has been
extensively studied by financial economists (see McDonald and
Siegel [1986] and their references, as well as Ingersoll and
Ross[1987] for the case of interest rate uncertainty). Option
pricing techniques provide elegant solutions in the case of an
individual irreversible investment project with uncertain payoffs:
such a project will be adopted only when the expected discounted
payoff from investment exceeds the cost by an amount that depends
on the level of uncertainty, and can be impressively large for
plausible parameter values. Even risk neutral firms are, in a
sense, reluctant to invest when projects are irreversible and the
future is uncertain: if the irreversible project is adopted the
option to wait for some of the uncertainty to be resolved is given
up, and options are valuable even to risk-neutral agents. These
models primarily study the decision to adopt an individual
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investment project whose payoff is independent of past and future
investment decisions. The results are clearly relevant to the
study of investment from a macroeconomic point of view:
Bernanke[1983] notes that the level of uncertainty perceived by
firms is likely to vary cyclically, and emphasizes that
irreversibility effects are important for the understanding of the
cyclical behavior of aggregate investment.
But most of the option valuation models so far available only
consider the optimal timing for the adoption of an individual
project with given characteristic: neglecting the availability of
many investment projects of different sizes and with different
characteristics at different points in time, they do not provide a
proper dynamic investment model. The important fact that adoption
of an investment project today changes the menu of projects
available tomorrow should be explicitly taken into account to
clarify the relationship of the option pricing models to the more
traditional macroeconomic investment models. Pindyck~19~6]
applies option pricing techniques to the marginal investment
decision: his firm sequentially decides the optimal amount of
capacity to be installed, knowing that future demand (and
production) are uncertain and follow a geometric Brownian motion
stochastic process with known parameters.
This Chapter studies irreversible putty-putty investment
under uncertainty: capital has no value unless used in production,
but can ex-post be optimally combined with other factors to adapt
to news about the variables exogenous to the firm. Using the
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results of Chapter 1, it is possible to reconcile the option-based
financial literature with Arrow's and Nickell's results under
certainty. The solution to the irreversible capital accumulation
problem has a closed form under a simplifying (but not totally
unrealistic) set of assumptions. Using this closed form solution
permits a straightforward comparison between the behavior of
investment under irreversibility and its behavior in the more
usual convex-costs-of-adjustment models; moreover, the dynamic
behavior and the ergodic distribution of the value of the firm, of
marginal Q and of average Q are easily derived, and the
implications of investment irreversibility for empirical work on
investment can be discussed.
Section 1 describes a simplified model of a firm faced by
exogenous uncertainty. Section 2 obtains the solution to the
investment problem, and discusses the dependence of its form on
the degree of uncertainty facing the firm. Section 3 derives the
long-run characteristics of irreversible capital accumulation;
Section 4 discusses the implications of investment irreversibility
for empirically relevant observable variables: the value of the
firm, the shadow price of capital relative to the purchase price
of capital, and Tobin's Q. Section 5 considers the implications of
the results for the interpretation of empirical evidence on
investment behavior, and comments on the realism and relevance of
the irreversibility constraint. Section 6 concludes.
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1 - A model of production and sales.
In partial equilibrium, a firm is characterized by its
production and demand functions, and by the form of the stochastic
processes it takes as givenu Consider then a firm endowed with a
Cobb-Douglas production function 3 and a constant elasticity demand
function:
O<u<l , 4»0
O</-lep<l
where Qt denotes production and sales at instant t (inventories
are assumed away for simplicity); ~ indexes the return to scale in
production: constant returns to scale are given by ~=1. Bt is the
product price at time t, and ~ indexes the firm's monopoly power:
the inverse of the markup factor is equal to ~, and the firm's
monopoly power increases as ~ approaches zero. For a competitive
firm IJ equals 1. The factor of production L t , "labor", is
perfectly flexible and can be rented at the instantaneous price
Wt : At is an index of technological progress. The capital stock,
3 the Cobb-Douglas production function is of course the workhorse
of investment theory; recent applications related to this Chapter,
in that the uncertainty facing the firm is modeled in continuous
time, include: Dietrich and Heckerman [1980], who solve for the
one-time choice of capital stock by a competitive firm producing
with decreasing returns to scale; Abel [1983, 1985], who studies
the investment problem under constant returns and perfect
competition when there are constant-elasticity costs of capital
stock adjustment; McDonald and Siegel [1985] extend Dietrich and
Heckerman's model to the case where there is a fixed cost for
production, so that the factory may be shut down; and McDonald and
Siegel [1986] derive the value of an investment opportunity in a
Cobb-Douglas plant of fixed size, and the optimal timing of its
adoption.
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Kt , can be increased at any time by paying the unit price Pt , but
installed capital has no value unless used in production (i.e. its
resale price is zero). The parameter Dt influences the position of
the demand curve (it may be a function of the consumers' income,
or of a price index for substitutes, that the firm takes as given
in its optimization): if ~=1, Dt=B t is simply the market price,
which a competitive firm takes as given.
Define the operating-profits function
subject to [1.1], [1.2]
Since there are no constraints on the adjustment of labor
input, this maximum is always attained by the firm; some algebra
shows that operating profits can be written as
where
f3 -
l-(l-a)4JJ.l
, -1<13<0
{l-a)4J~ 1
Z = at/JIJ [(tPJ.l(1-a)J1-(1-U>4>1J - [4>IJ(l-U>Jl-(l-U)4>IJ] [1+8J
t- l-(l-u)4>1J
1 -(l-a)et>J.l
The variable Zt summarizes at every instant the business
conditions for the firm: it is higher the higher is the demand
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indicator Dt , and the lower is the ratio of the flexible-factor
rental cost wt to its productivity At-
Uncertainty is introduced in the model by the assumption that
{Wt }, {At} I {Dt } and the purchase price of capital, IP t }, are
stochastic processes described by geometric Brownian motion in
continuous time. In words, it is assumed that wages, price of
capital and demand are always expected to grow at some constant
rate, but the growth rate fluctuates randomly, so that the outlook
farthe£ and farther ahead is increasingly uncertain. Future values
of the exogenous variables are jointly lognormally distributed,
conditional on their current values, with variance proportional to
the length of the forecast interval. 4
It is then easy to show that {Zt J , being a
constant-elasticity function of geometric Brownian motion process,
follows itself a geometric Brownian motion process (multiplicative
functions of lognormally distributed random variables are
lognormally distributed); denote ~z the drift parameter of {ZtJ
and a its standard deviation parameter, and similarly define
z
parameters for the stochastic process of the purchase price of
capital:
[1.5] dZt=Zt~zdt+ZtOzdWzt
[1.6] dPt=Pt~pdt+PtUpdWpt
4All variables shculd of course be expressed in real terms, i.e.
wages and demand should be deflated by the price of the
consumption basket of the firm's owners.
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where dW
zt and dWpt are the increments of (possibly correlated)
standard Wiener processes.
The parameters ~ and a are linear combinations of the
z z
drifts, variances and covariances of the wage, productivity and
demand processes, with weights depending on technology and demand
~arameters. In empirical work it would be necessary to estimate
the importance of each source of uncertainty for the firm; but
here (Zt)' the shifter of the reduced-form profit function, is
taken as the primitive exogenous variable in the firm's problem.
The parameter 8 indexes the concavity of the reduced-form
profit function with respect to the installed capital stock. The
shape of the re~uced-form profit function depends on the degree of
monopoly power and returns to scale, as well as on the
Cobb-Douglas share of the flexible factor in production.If ~~=1
then ~=O, and the reduced form profit function is linear in K and
the firm is indifferent to the level of the capital stock; if ~=O
(a unit-elastic demand function), then ~=-1 and arbitrarily large
profits can be obtained by producing arbitrarily small amounts. In
both these cases the value-maximization problem of the firm is
ill-defined.
2 - Optimal irreversible investment decisions
Assume that the objective of the firm's managers is to
maximize the discounted expected value of profits, and that
- r, the required rate of return, is constant;
- the installed capital stock depreciates at the constant exponential
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-r (T-t) [ 1 1+f3
e --- K Z dT -
1+/3 T T
rate o.
The firm's problem at any time t is then to choose a
contingent investment rule {Xt }, or - which is the same - a
stochastic process fKtJ, to maximize its value: the state of the
system is completely described by three state variables: the
installed capital stock Kt : the state of affairs Zt: and P t , the
price at which additional capital can be purchased. Denote
*V (Kt,Zt'P t ) the firm's value if the managers follow the optimal
investment rule.
As noted in Chapter 1, lIirreversibility" is implied by the
resale price of capital being equal to (or lower than) zero, given
that the marginal contribution of capital to profits as defined
above is nonnegative: the firm will never discard installed
capital if the resale price is zero, since capital in place cannot
decrease the operating profits. But the ortimality conditions can
be better understood if the irreversibility constraint is
explicitly imposed and constrained maximization theory is used on
the value function.
Define then the value function, and thr~ related optimization
problem, as follows:
00
= ~~:,Et{f
t
subject to dKT= -oKTdT + dXT (capital stock dynamics)
and to dX t 2: 0
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(irreversibility constraint)
Note that jumps in the capital stock are not excluded a
priori: the gross investment rate dXt/dt could well be infinite,
and for this reason the amount of control is not multiplied by dt
in the capital dynamics equation. The second integral in [2.1] is
defined in the Stiltjes sense, with {X t } as the integrating
function.
The expectation E t in [2.1] is taken ov~r the joint
distribution of the IKtJ, {P t } and {Zt} processes, conditional on
the information available at time t, taking into account that
investment decisions will be taken optimally (subject to the
irreversibility constraint) in the future.
At any time t, the irreversibility constraint imposes that
dXt~O, or, which is the same, Kt+~Kt_: heuristically, the
following Kuhn-Tucker first order conditions with respect to Kt
(or to dXt ) must necessarily hold:
[2.2]
- (r+6) (T-t) fJ
e K"
*The left-hand side of [2.2] and [2.3] is the derivative of V
with respect to Kt +, the shadow price of capital. These first
order co~ditions are based, as usual, on a feasible perturbation
argument in which all controls except one are assumed given (in
probability distribution): the currently marginal unit of
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installed capital is therefore viewed, allowing for depreciation,
as the marginal unit throughout the infinite future. The firm
knows that conditions like [2.2] and [2.3] will be satisfied at
all future times: this defines the (yet to be found) probability
distribution of future capital stocks, which is used in taking the
expectation in [2.2] and [2.3].
We now provide sufficient conditions for existence of a
solution to [2.1], and sketch a proof of uniqueness of the optimal
investment rule:
Proposition
a) Provided that
1 1
r > (itp (1 + 8) - {J z 8
where
[2.4] <1 2 == <1: + <1; - 2 P <1z<1p P==(dWztdWzt]/dt
is the variance of the rate of increase of the process
{Zt/PtJ, the irreversible investment problem
*has a solution, i.e. the value function V defined in [2.1]
exists (is bounded);
b) if an investment rule [R] can be found that satisfies
[2.2] or [2.3] at all times, then [R] is the unique solution of
the optimization problem [2.1].
Proof:
a) If investment were reversible, so that the firm could at
any time buy or sell capital at price Pt , the risk-neutral
manager's problem would be the same as if there were a rental
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market for capital, with instantaneous rental rate (r-~p+o}Pt;then
the capital stock would always satisfy the first order condition
(r-t} +6} P
p "r
implying that
and that
Consider the present discounted value of operating profits
under conditions of reversible investment: noting that the order
of expectation and integration can be reversed, by Fubini's
theorem, as long as both operations are well-defined, we have
[2.6]
-r(T-t) 1
e
1+13
-r(T-t) 1 {l+B }
e --- E t KT ZT dT =1+13
t
1+8 l+B
I -r (T-t) 1 f )13 {[p ] 13 }= e --- r-~ +0 Et TZ ZT dT1+/3" p T
p 1+f3
Now note that [~] 8 ZT ,being a constant-elasticity
ZT
combination of lognormal variables, is lognorrnally distributed
given the information available at time t(T: ; the easiest way to
find its expectation is to use Ito's lemma, that gives
d[ 1+1/13 -l/fJ ] =Pt Zt
1+1/13 -1/f3 [(~p(l + 1 1 2 1+13 1C1 ) dt += P t Zt -) - it + -B z 13 2 13 8
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13
It follows that
1+f3
+ -- a
p
dW -pt
1+13
f3
1 1 0 2 1+8 1
( f1 ( 1+-) - it - + - ~ J(T - t )
P {3 z8 2 8 fJ
e
and it is easy to see that the integral in [2.6] converges if and
only if
[2.7]
1 1
r > [~p(l + 8) - ~z B 0
2 1+/3 1
+ - --- -J ' as was to be shown.
2 B 8
Imposing the irreversibility constraint and subtracting
investment expenditures can only decrease the value of the firm,
which therefore is bounded. 5
b)6 By standard Kuhn-Tucker theory, uniqueness of the optimal
..
investment policy follows from concavity of the maximand, V , at
times when investment is positive: the first order condition [2.2]
is then sufficient as well as necessary. (As to the alternative
first order condition [2.3], it is clearly not optimal to invest
when it applies, since positive investment would immediately
decrease the value of the firm).
*Concavity of V (Kt,Zt) follows from concavity in Kt of the
5 [2.7] turns out to be necessar~, as well as sufficient, for
existence of the value function~ ~ee the expression for the value
of the firm in [4.1] below.
6Ricardo Caballero suggested this line of proof.
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instantaneous operating profit function ll(Kt,Zt); since Kt +
increases linearly with dX t , the instantaneous cash flow function
*
n(Kt,Zt)-PtdXtis concave in dX t . The value function V (Kt,Zt)is
the integral of instantaneous cash flows sample paths, over states
of nature and time, with positive measure (the joint probability
measure of density of ZT' PT ( KT , and the discount factor); to
*prove concavity of V (.,.) in its first argument it is sufficient
to show that KT and -dXT are nondecreasing in Kt , t<T.
7 But
investment irreversibility implies that more investment at ·time t,
all else being equal, will never result in a lower K
T
or in a
*higher dXT (T)t), and therefore concavity of V (Kt,Zt)is
guaranteed.
[end of proof]
The firm's dynamic optimization problem is, on the basis of
this proposition, completely solved if an investment rule that
satisfies [2.2] and [2.3] can be found; this is typically a
difficult task, but in our framework the following can be shown to
be true using the results of Chapter 1:
1) Under the assumptions given above, conditions [2.2J and [2.3] are
satisfied if the firm invests following the rule:
7 a nondecreasing function of a concave function is weakly
concave; the current cash flow is strictly concave; and sums (or
integrals) of concave functions are strictly concave if one of the
elements is strictly concave.
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Whenever possible, install more capital so as to satisfy
al1 (Kt I Zt) 1 K
f3
Z A
(r + 6 + 613 - ~zJ *t[R] = = - c
a K t P t P t A-l
where
2
1(~z -613-~p_:2) 2+2 (r+6-~p)a2[~ -613-~ - :) +- z p 1 8A = > -
2 13(J
and 2 2 2a -0 +a -2paa
z p z p
*NOTE: c , the ratio of marginal productivity of capital to the
purchase price of capital at times when investment is positive, is
a constant, i.e. it does not depend on time nor on P t nor on Zt-
2) The shadow value of capital is, if the firm adopts rule [R],
[2.8]
- (r+o) (T-t) {3
e KT ZT
K(3 Z
t
r + 0 + 58 - it
z
8 (-I3A) is the positive solution to the quadratic equation
0
2 2 1 1 0 2 1
2132 X - [~z 13 + 6 -~p 13 - ;- 13] X - [r+6-~pJ = 0
and it is pvssible to verify that -~A>l, implying that A>-l/~, as
long as the condition in [2.7] holds.
72
3) The value of each installed unit of capital, regardless of the
possibility of installing more capital in the future, is
r+6-(it -6(3)
z
[2.9]
while the value of the opportunity to install capital in the future
· · b 91.5 g1ven y
[2.10]
It is possible to verify that, under the investment rule [R],
whenever investment is positive the shadow value of capital is
equal to P t (so that condition [2.2] is satisfied) and the
following holds true:
which can be interpreted to say that whenever a marginal unit
of capital is installed it is the case that v{.), the expected
discounted 'value of marginal profits from the currently marginal
units, exactly compensates the out-of-pocket cost of installation,
9This formula is the same as that found by McDonald and
Siegel[1986] for a single investment opportunity of given size. As
noted in Chapter 1, each infinitesimal increment of the installed
capital stock defines an investment opportunity (of infinitesimal
size) of the kind considered by McDonald and Siegel's optimal
stopping problem.
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P t , plus the opportunity cost of immediate installation, F(.): the
firm could delay installation and learn something about the future
evolution of the business conditions, as summarized by {Zt J I and
of the price of capital {Ptl; this opportunity to wait has value,
because in the immediate future the price of capital might
decrease (making delayed installation of the same unit less
costly) or business conditions might deteriorate, decreasing v(.)
and making installation of the currently marginal unit of capital
unprofitable.
*Figure 1 plots c as a function of a for several values of B;
values for the other parameters are given in the figure. The firm
is more reluctant to invest the higher is th~ variability of its
environment, summarized by a (note that a is a combination of
variances and covariances of the processes for demand, wage,
productivity, and capital price).
This is not surprising, because higher demand variability
worsens the "worst case" scenario, in which the firm regrets the
irreversible investment decision. Higher variance does not
symmetrically improve tlle "best case" scenario: whenever demand
increases, or wage decreases, or price of capital falls, the firm
can easily increase the capital stock. The irreversibility
constraint only binds in the case of adverse realizations of
uncertainty, and from the point of view of the firm effectively
truncates the (lognormal) probability distribution of future
states of nature. Bernanke[1983] refers to this insight as the"
'ba& news principle of irreversible investment' ... of all
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possible future outcomes, only the unfavorable ones have a bearing
on the current propensity to undertake a given project ... tI.
*When a~O it appears from the figure that c ~(r-~ +6), thep
Jorgenson[1963] rental cost of capital: it can be verified
algebraically (using l'Hopital's rule) that this is indeed the
case as long as
[2.11] ~ -o8-~ > 0
z p
[2.11] implies that, under certainty, the irreversibility
constraint is never binding (the firm's desired dotation of
capital steadily increases).
If [2.11] is not satisfied, in the absence of uncertainty the
firm never wants to increase the capital stock, except when it is
set up and a capital stock is chosen taking the irreversibility
constraint into account: it is again possible to verify that, as
a~o, [R] converges to the appropriate limit for this case if
[2.11] is not true.
The value of the marginal productivity of capital that
triggers investment is higher, for a given a, if 8 is lower in
absolute value, i.e. the instantaneous operating profit function
is less concave in K. The reason for this is that, for a given
6>0, a large 181 implies that the marginal profitability of
capital increases more rapidly when gross investment is zero.
It is of course possible to invert the marginal condition in
[R] and find an expression for the firm's desired capital stock as
a function of the current value of Z and P:
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Recall that ~<O, so the desired capital stock is higher the
higher is Z (i.e. the lower is the wage and the stronger is
demand) I and the lower is Pt - Figure 2 plots the desired capital
stock for given Z and P, as a function of a, for several values of
B: higher uncertainty implies a lower desired capital stock,
because the firm knows 'that the "worst case" is very likely to
occur and hedges against possible decreases in Z or P.af capital
is decreasing in 181 for given P, Z and o. Desired capital
decreases in I~I for given P, Z and a: a firm with high I~I has
more monopoly power and/or more strongly decreasing returns to
scale, hence tends to supply less, and use less capital, to
maximize its profits.
This completes the normative analysis of the irreversible
capital accumulation problem: if the current capital stock Kt is
*smaller than K (Zt'P t ) I the firm immediately invests so that
* *K =K . if Kt is larger than K the firm does not invest (and thet I I
capital stock is reduced by depreciation). Of course, since
downward fluctuations of Z are possible, the firm will sometimes
regret the investment decision; similarly, the firm will regret
having invested when P decreases at a rate higher than the
required rate of return: the same investment opportunity exercised
yesterday could be more profitably exercised today.
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3 - The steady-state characteristics of irreversible capital
accumulation
The previous section has derived and ~haracterized the
optimal irreversible investment rule, which could be of interests
to some firm's managers. Economists might also be interested in a
somewhat different perspective on the problem: if in fact managers
knew all along the optimal irreversible investment rule (and
therefore did not need to read the previous section), what would
be the empirically observable characteristics of optimal
irreversible capital accumulation?
Usually, normative theory straightforwardly characterizes the
behavior of endogenous variables: agents are provided by a set of
rules that at all times determines their behavior, and agents'
behavior uniquely determines the endogenous variables' paths. But
this is not true of the irreversible investment problem: the
managers of the firm do not continuously control the capital
stock. The model's endogenous variables have autonomous dynamics
most of the time, and determination of the characteristics of the
model from the point of view of an outside observer is of
independent interest.
The dynamic behavior of the model is interesting, though
difficult to describe formally. Investment occurs in spurts,
whenever the price of capital and business conditions are
sufficiently favorable.
This section is more simply concerned with the long-run
characteristics of irreversible capital accumulation: given that
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the firm is following the rule described in the previous section,
what should an observer (who is ignorant of the firm's history)
expect about the relationship of the firm's capital stock to other
observable quantities at any given moment in time?
To answer this, we have to compute the "ergodic" or "steady
staten distribution of some variable. The exogenous processes are
assumed above to be nonstationary, and therefore fail to possess a
steady-state distribution: but there are functions of the exogenous
processes and of the installed capital stock which do possess a
steady state distribution.
The ratio of the marginal profitability of currently
installed capital to the current purchase price of capital plays
an important role in the investment rule: it will be convenient to
define
[3.1]
This quantity follows a regulated geometric Brownian motion
if the firm follows rule [R]i Ito's lemma can be used to derive
the stochastic differential of ~t when the firm is not investing:
d~t = d[ K~ Zt Pt-1 ] =
13-1 -1
= B Kt Zt Pt (-OKtdt) +
1
Denote m the drift parameter of the geometric Brownian motion
process followed by {~t) when no investment takes place, and note
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that a (as defined in [2.4] above) is its standard deviation
parameter:
2
m = -ol3+it -{J +0 -po (J
z p p z p
I 2 ~a = a + a - 2pa az p z p
The investment policy [R] imposes on r~t} an upper control
*barrier at c : capital will be installed as necessary to prevent
*~t from being larger than c · ~t is then a geometric Brownian
*motion with a reflecting barrier at C I and applying Ito's lemma
*it can be shown that -In(~t) + In(c ) is a linear Brownian motion
2process with a control barrier at zero, drift -(m-a /2) and
standard deviation a; the ergodic ditribution for such a process
is known10 to exist as long as the drift is negative, i.e. (from
the definitions above for m and a) as long as
This requires both that {~t} have a tendency to drift
(upwards) towards the investment point, and that there not be too
:2 2
much "noise" in the model: (] and a should be reasonably small
z p
compared to the drift parameters 6, ~ and ~ . If [3.2] is not
z p
*satisfied, the density of (-In(~t) + In(c ) J goes to zero
everywhere in [0,00), implying that the density of ~ degenerates to
a spike arbitrarily close to zero (the log function has infinite
slope at zero, but a geometric Brownian motion process can never
10see for example Cox and Miller[1965] page 225.
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reach zero from positive values): ~ converges to zero in
probability for all initial conditions. Some intuition about this
2degeneracy can be obtained considering the certainty case: if a =
z
:2 2
a = a =0 and [3.2] is not satisfied, the firm would neverp
undertake a dynamic investment strategy, but would limit itself to
a once-and-for-all acquisition of capital when it is set up
(compare [3.2] with [2.11]): then the ratio of capital's marginal
profitability to its purchase price would certainly converge to
zero as t~. In the presence of uncertainty, the firm would invest
not only at the beginning of time but also at other points in
time, when business conditions and/or the price of capital are
*favorable enough to obtain ~t=c , even though [3.2] is not true;
but in the limit the probability of observing ~>O goes to zero all
the same, because good business condition~ and/or low price of
capital are so very unlikely if [3.2] is not true.
If [3.2] is satisfied, the ergodic distribution of the (~tl
process is well defined and is exponential (see Cox and
Miller(1965] , p.225):
prOb(-ln(~) + In(c*) ~ x] = 1 - l(x~O) e
22(m-s /2)
2 x
S
It is then a simple matter to invert the monotonic function
*f{~)=-ln(~t) + In(c ) and find the ergodic cumulative distribution
function of ~:
m
, J -- [Xc.]2~ - 1 ( *J[ 3 • 3] Prob l~ s x lOs xs c
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The steady-state density of ~ is plotted in Figure 3 for
different levels of undertainty. Naturally, if there were no
uncertainty this density would degenerate to a spike located at
(r-~ +6); as uncertainty becomes more important, and the upper
p
/ *
limit of the distribution shifts to the right as c increases,
more and more probability density is located at low values of ~.
Simple integration shows that, in the ergodic steady state,
the mean of ~ is
[3.4]
2
t = r m - a / 2] c * =
l m
2 2-68+~ -(a /2) - ~ +(0 /2)
z z p p
2-oa+~ -~ +a -pa a
z p p z p
*c
- *Of course, o<~<c (as long as [3.2] is satisfied and the
*expectation is well defined), since O<~t~C for all t.
~f [3.2] is satisfied, this expression can be shown to be
equal to r+6-~ when there is no uncertainty (02 = a 2 = 0), and top z p
be strictly less than that when there is uncertainty and the
irreversibility constraint is sometimes binding.
Figures 4a and 4b plot the ergodic mean of ~ as a function of
o and a , for several values of the technology and demand
z p
parameter ~. It is apparent from the figures that when the
parameters are such as to make the firm more reluctant to invest
ex-ante, they are also such that the firm will ex-post be using
more capital compared to the reversible investment case.
The presence of uncertainty, while making the firm more
reluctant ex-ante to undertake irreversible investment, also makes
adverse realizations of business conditions or decreases in the
84
Fig. 40- Z-uncertointy
o
00
trJ
,...... c·, ~=-·O.20
1Jp=O.02 "z=O.02 ap=O.03 p=O.30__ -- c·, P=-O.40
__ -- c· ~=-O.60
0=0.07 r=0.10 __ -- ::: :::: ::::: ::::,,-: ;i--O.80
----:::::::::::--
- ;;;=~:::=::::::--
- ~ ~
o
~--.Avg(~), 13=-0.80
~ ----.AvgW. (J= -0.60
~V9W. P=-::>·40
L/)
o
o
00
C"
o
o
0.170.140.100.070.03
L{)
O-.....-_~-_Io---_-....-_---...__....A-_-..-_..-..-_---_-..-_---
0 0 .00
~ • ----J
Fig. 4b- P-uncertointy
c·. ~=-O.20
./'
C·, ~=-O.40
/'
c", P=-O.60
/
c·, P=-O.BO
""
~p=O.02 ~z=O.02 (Tz=O.oo p=O.30
/'0=0.07 r=O.10
./
/' ,/
./ ./
/' ,./",
/' ./'
,/' /
,/ .-/ r'"/' /'
,./ / ./"/' /'
/' ".." ./
..........
/
.",.-
./ ",."..
",... ,; ,...,-
/'
.......... ~
--
.,/
--
~
--."..., ;;;: ~.:;::; :;;...-
o
~ L-------..::::=:::::~==~~~==.;..-==========AA~gff~: ~ ~=8:~8
vg(t). p= -0.40o
o
o
a vg(t), Ps:-O.20
0.170.140.100.070.03
N
~~_....... , __a...-_-""-_-.l ........__-'--_--l,,_----'
0 0 .00
85
price of capital so likely that, ex-post, irreversible capital
accumulation results on average in higher capital int~nsity of
production. The empirical implications of this are discussed in
section 5 below.
4 - The value of the firm, average Q and marginal Q
It is possible to compute the value of the firm by
in~egrating the value of all marginal units of capital, both those
installed and those yet to be installed, given in [2.9] and
[2.10]. If the firm never installed any more capital, each of the
currently installed units would still, while progressively
depreciating, produce a cash-flow with present expected value as
given in [2.9]. Moreover, the firm does hold the option to install
further units: an option is always valuable, since it provides its
owner with the right, but not the obligation, to acquire an asset.
In the framework cOllsidered here, the option's value can be shown
to equal the expression F{~) in [2.10].
Simple integration th~n obtains the following expression for
the firm's value:
dx + JF[XtZttP t ] dx =
K t
=
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dJt =
=1 K1+8 Z
t t
1+8 r+6-(~ -68)
z
+
Note that -~A)l is necessary and sufficient for convergence
of the second integral above: this is guaranteed to be true as
long as the condition in [2.7] above is satisfied. If ~A~l, the
value function fails to exist because the value of the options to
install capital in the future does not converge.
*Also note that Kt<K is never observed, because if that were
the case the capital stock would instantaneously be increased to
* *K . The value function is defined over the K<K region as
V*[K*(Zt,Pt>,Zt,Pt]-Pt[K*(Zt,Pt>-K]: if for any reason the firm
* *finds itself with K<K , (K -K) units of capital are immediately
* * *purchased and V (K ,Z,P) is obtained. V is continuously
differentiable, is concave in the relevant region, and its slope
*equals Pt at or below K (Pt,Zt).
Figure Sa plots the value of the firm against K for several
values of a (the values for the other parameters are given in the
z
figure); and Figure 5b perfurms the same experiment for several
values of n.
For given K, Z and P, the firm is more valuable the more
volatile the business conditions process is: as Pindyck[1986]
notes, when demand is very volatile the options to invest are
worth more. Most of the value of firms faced by high uncertainty
consists of the opportunity to invest in the future (the "growth
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options") .11
It is also worth noticing that firms whose 8 has a low
absolute value (indicating high monopoly power and/or strongly
decreasing returns to scale) have higher value, given K, for the
same value of Z and P: such firms earn large monopoly profits or
inframarginal rents.
It is easy to derive the dynamic behavior of the firm's
value, by Ito's lemma:
1 1 KflA+lzA 1
+ t t [(-O(8A+l)+A~z+(1-A)~p+-2 A(A-l)02]dt
A-1 -8A-l c*A p~-l
+ Aa d~~ t+ (l-A) a dW t ]
z z p p
1 2
Noting that -o(BA+l)+A~ +(l-A)~ +- A(A-l)a = r from the
z p 2
definition of A, it is possible to verify that
*This is true by construction, since V is defined in [2.1]
above as the present discounted value of cash flows: the expected
l1Note that we assume here that the demand function completely
describes the market situation of the firm: in particular, if good
business conditions would induce other firms to enter the market,
then the process for the demand index Dt should take this into
account. In practice, it would be difficult to accurately specify
such a demand process for any individual firm, because barriers to
entry are not observable.
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proportional return (cash flow plus capital gains) from holding
the firm's stock for one instant is equal to the required rate of
return.
However, the fluctuations of the return around its expected
values are not normally distributed. In other words, the value of
the firm does not follow a geometric Brownian motion, even though
the processes that characterize the firm's environment do:
*and this expression is not proportional to V •
The firm's value fails to have a conditionally lognormal
distribution because the cash-flow process follows geometric
Brownian motion almost always, but has a singular component at
times of positive gross investment. From another point of view,
the total firm value is given by the sum of discounted operating
profits from currently installed capital and of the "growth
options": each of the components has normally distributed returns
under the assumptions made above, but the relative importance of
the two components varies as the firm finds itself closer or
farther from the investment point.
When far from the investment point, the options to invest in
the future are less valuable and their weight decreases: since the
options are more volatile than the profits from installed capital,
the conditional variance of returns decreases after an increase in
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the price of capital or a deterioration of the business
conditions. Since such occurrences also decrease the total value
of the firm, it appears that investment irreversibility should
imply lower variability of returns after abnormally low
realizations of returns: this is not true in the data (see for
example Nelson[1987]), and more research will be needed to clarify
the relationship between the firms' irreversible investment
decisions and the volatility of stock market returns. 12
The non-normality of returns from holding the firm's stock
implies that r, the required rate of return, cannot be computed by
a simple application of a Capital Asset Pricing Model. Further
research should relate this finding to the Capital Budgeting
literature's "project beta" concept, and obtain a relationship
between the required rate of return en the sum total of the firm's
assets and the rate of re~urn to be used in evaluating the
opportunity of undertaking incremental investment in the firm's
capital stock.
An important variable in empirical research on investment is-
the so-called "Marginal Q", defined as the ratio of the shadow
price of capital to the market price of uninstal1ed capital: Abel
12It will also be necessary to study the implications of the model
proposed here in a richer financial environment, allowing for a
choice of financing instruments (stocks or bonds). There probably
exist dynamic leverage policies that can reconcile the model with
evidence on stock values and produce smooth dividend payments. In
the model above, firms engaged in rapid investment pay negative 8
dividends (issue shares) at times of positive investment, when K Z
dt < dX P.
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and Blanchard[1986] argue that not only should investment be
related to this quantity, but that marginal Q should be the only
determinant of investment decisions.
Under the assumption of investment irreversibility, it is
eas7 to compute marginal Q from the results of the previous
sections of this chapter: recalling the expression for the shadow
value of capital in [2.8] above, and using the definition of ~t in
[3.1] ,
K{3 1 [K13 ZJA-1Z - _ t t KfJ Ztt t * t 1A c P t[4. 3] Q
m = =
r + 0 + o{3 - (J P t
z
1 [~~*JA-1~t
A
~t
=
r + 0 + 0/3 - it
z
It is easy to check that, under the investment rule [R] I Q ~1
m
always, and Q =1 when the firm is investing13 : moreover, Q is
m m
~:
monotonically increasing in ~t in the relevant range O<~tSC , and
it is therefore possible to compute the ergodic distribution of Q
m
using ~'s distribution derived above.
Unfortunately, the function Q =Q (~) does not have an iJl1verse
m m
in closed form, and it is necessary to invert it numerically to
find ~=Q-l(q). Differentiating [3.3] above we find the ergodic
m
13the same nonlinear relationship between irreversible investment
and Q is noted by Sargent[1979b], in his general equilibrium model.
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density of ~:
[4. 4]
m
2 - 1)
a
and it is then possible to compute the ergodic density of Q using
m
the relationship:
-1
-1 ] fr, [Q: 1 (q) J
~ ;:Q (q)
m
As long as condition [3.2] holds true, implying that
investment occurs "often" and ergodic distributions exist, the
ergodic density of marginal q has a sharp spike at 1: but lower
values of Q can be observed with positive probability, when firms
m
face very unfavorable business conditions or the price of capital
is very high.
Once numerical values are found for Q 's density, an
m
approximate ergodic mean can be computed by summation rather than
integration: Table 1 reports the results.
The mean of Q is strictly less than one, and is lower for
m
14
smaller I~I and larger o. When 0=0 and [3.2] is true, marginal Q
is identically equal to one, since the firm is always investing;
if uncertainty is large, lower values will be more often observed.
14a small Inl implies that the shadow value of capital is only very
slowly decreased by depreciation, and investment is less likely to
occur.
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TABLE 1 - ERGODIC MEAN OF MARGINAL Q
a =0.051 (J =0.101 a =0.13
z z z
(3=-0.25 0.898 0.734 0.568
(3=-0.50 0.929 0.861 0.784
B=-0.75 0.938 0.900 0.856
Note to the table: mean of the ergodic distribution, ob~ained
by numerical approximation of the density; Q (~) was
m
numerically inverted at a grid of ~ points, 0.005
apart. Parameter values: P=l, Z=l, ~ =0.02, a =0.03, r=.15,p p
0=.07, ~ =.02, P=.3.
z
*The formula f~r V could in principle be used to correct the
specification of empirical investment equations that use stock
market data to compute "average qU. Hayashi [1986] shows in a
convex-costs-of-adjustment model that average q is the correct
independent variable in an ~nvestment equation only under perfect
competition and constant returns to scale. Here it is necessary to
violate at least one of these conditions to obtain the investment
rule, but the results still provide useful insights. Average Q is
*the ratio of the market value of the firm, V , to the replacement
cost of the currently installed capital stock: this can easily
computed, for the model proposed here, as
(3
Kt Zt
1 P t 1 1 [K8 Z )AQJ. = +
-8A-l :.p:.1+13 r+6-(lt -6(3) A-l
z
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*Since ~t~ c under [R], and A-l>O, there is an upper bound to
average Q:
1 1
A-l -I3A-l
= + =
A 1 1 A(-{3A-l) + 1
A-l A-l -~A-l (A-i) (-~A-l)
Positive investment is only observed when average Q attains
its maximum value. There is however no lower bound on QA' as there
is no lower bound on Q : a firm can be very unlucky, and
m
experience such a bad drop in Z or such a large increase in P that
as to bring average and marginal Q arbitrarily close to zero.
Since A>l and -~A)l, average Q is a monotonic function of ~t
and therefore, like marginal Q, possesses an ergodic distribution
as long as ~t does. The same numerical procedure that was used for
marginal Q can be used to compute average Q's ergodic distribution
and ergodic mean: the results are reported in Figures 6a and 6b
and in Table 2.
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TABlE 2 - ERGODIC MEAN OF AVERAGE Q
a=0.051 C1 =0.101 a =0.13
z z z
f3=-O.25 1.506 1 .. 625 2.244
13=-0.50 2.538 2.520 2.436
B~-0.75 5.600 5.535 5.447
Note to the table: mean of the ergodic distribution, obtained
by numerical approximation; QA(~) was numerically inverted at
a grid of ~ points, 0.005 apart. The averages reported in
Figure 6 do not correspond exactly to those in Table 2
because a more widely spaced grid was used in constructing
the figure. Parameter values: P=l, Z=l, ~ =0.02, a =0.03,p p
r=.15, 0=.07, ~ =.02, P=.3.
z
Average Q is very large if n is large in absolute value, as
implied by high monopoly r~wer or strongly decreasing returns to
scale: Hayashi [1986] shows that average Q should fluctuate around
one for perfectly competitive firms operating under constant
returns to scale and convex costs of capital adjustment, while
monopoly power and decreasing returns would produce higher values
of average Q. Empirically, average Q is not very high (see for
example Hoshi and Kashyap[1987]), which would seem to rule out
values of IBI much larger than .5 for the model proposed here if
the other parameters have the values reported in the note to the
figure.
The dispersion of QA's ergodic distribution is larger for
large 0 (see Figure 6), but the value of its ergodic mean is not
z
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very sensitive to the degree of uncertainty facing the firm15 . This
is not surprising, however, since it has been shown above that
mo~e uncertainty causes more capital to be installed in the
~rgodic steady state, increasing the denominator of QA' but also
implies that the value of the firre is higher for any installed
capital stock, which incraases the numerator of QA- The net effect
of higher uncertainty appears very small.
5 - Implications of investment irreversibility for empirical work
The basic irreversibility ~nsight should prove useful in
empirical work on investment. Naturally, the simple model proposed
in Section 1 should be made more realistic for empirical work,
including for example inventory fluctuations r time-to-build16 (see
Majd and Pindyck[1987]), a downward-sloping supply function for
capital goods, and so on.
This section discusses the relevance of the results reported
15at least, no systematic relationship is found by the computations
reported in Table 2; it might be the case that the numerical
procedure used is not precise enough to uncover a (shallow)
relationship.
16It is straightforward to include fixed delivery lags in the model
proposed above: if the firm knows with certainty that orders will
be filled, say, in a year, then the optimal stopping problem for the
installation of the marginal unit of capital is easy to solve since
the value of orders can be computed by modifying V(Kt,Zt) to be the
expectation of discounted marginal profits from the time of delivery
on. Delivery lags make the firm less reluctant to invest, if
capital can be paid at time of delivery: both good and bad
developments can occur before the time of delivery.
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above for the interpretation of empirical work on iavestment17
based on more traditional theoretical models.
It is not easy to evaluate the quantitative relevance of
capital accumulation irreversibility: the constraint is more
important the more uncertain is the firm's environment, the lower
is the expected rate of growth of the economy, the lower is the
depreciation rate, the steeper is the marginal profitability of
capital schedule. The more binding is the irreversibility
constraint, the less attractive is capital accumulation ex-ante
(firms try to use less capital under severe uncertainty) but,
conversely, the more capital intensive is production ex-post.
In aggregate data, gross investment is positive in all
periods, all countries, all sectors: on the one hand, this is
evidence in favor of investment irreversibility, because if
capital accumulation were in fact reversible negative gross
investment would sometimes be observed. But on the other hand, if
gross investment were in fact continuously positive then the
irreversibility constraint, though present, would never be binding
and would be completely irrelevant to the empirical study of
investment. Aggregate uncertainty is, in fact, sufficiently low
that desired negative aggregate investment is very unlikely for
realistic depreciation rates.
17The potential importance of investment irreversibility for the
interpretation of all economic variables should not be neglected:
adverse shocks will cause the capital stock to be (ex-post) too
large; if flexible factor demands and prices are correlated to the
exogenous processes (wages, demand ... ), a high degree of
permanence in the effects of positive and negative shocks will be
found. Moreover, the response to positive and negative shocks will
be asymmetric if the former induce the firm to invest.
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Of course, even though gross investment is never observed to
be zero, it is conceivable that decreasing the aggregate capital
stock could sometimes be desirable; the mere possibility of a very
bad drop in (say) demand or prices should reduce the desired
capital stock (increase the marginal productivity of capital
required for additions to the existing capital stock to be
desirable) even in periods of positive gross investment, while the
installed capital stock would ex-post turn out to be excessive
after the realization of the bad shock. These effects could in
principle be large, as shown in Figure 4.
More importantly, it is likely that the strict positivity of
gross investment at the aggregate level masks binding
irreversibility constraints at the level of individual firms, or
maybe individual capital goods. After all, it is self-evident that
not all firms invest in all types of capital goods, at all times,
in all locations18 : steel mills in Pittsburgh were left unutilized
when the u.s. steel industry underwent the 70s crisis; and any
firm exposed to international competition must, during the first
half of the 80s, have regretted investment decisions made in the
late 70s. The variability of individual stock prices is 3 or 4
times larger than the variability of aggregate stock price
indexes: and, as documented by Romer [1987] , production and sales
are several times more variable at the industry level than at the
level of the whole manufacturing sector - suggesting that
l8The same point was made by the discussants of Hall[1977].
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uncertainty is even larger at the firm level. Given large
disaggregate uncertainty, the irreversibility constraint will be
more binding the more specific to a firm's needs capital goods
are: trucks can obviously be sold to luckier firms when a negati.ve
idiosyncratic shock hits, but machine tools and plants generally
have very little value unless employed for their original intended
use. This obviously introduces difficult cross-section and time
aggregation problems in the study of aggregate investment, which
are best left to future research.
It should be easier to apply irreversible investment theory
at a more disaggregate level: but to accurately gauge the
parameters in the individual firm's problem it would necessary to
obtain estimates of the elasticity of the reduced-form profit
function to capital (which depends on the elasticity of demand as
well as on the substitutability of more flexible factors to
capital), and of the expected rates of growth and variances of
demand, wages and capital prices. This is clearly a formidable
task: identification of demand disturbances requires a
specification of the market structure, while all the endogenous
variables are jointly determined as functions of all exogenous
variables: even in the simplest model, the relationship between
the variables is highly nonlinear, and sophisticated
identification assumptions would be needed to obtain estimates.
In particular, it should be noted that the characteristics of
the firm's production and demand functions are important in
determining the weights given to the exogenous stochastic
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processes' parameters when deriving the parameters of the
stochastic process followed by the business conditions index Zt:
for example, the rate of wage inflation and its variability are
less important if (l-a), the share of labor in the Cobb-Douglas
production function, is small: and if ~~ is close to zero (the
firm has a lot of monopoly power, or produces under strongly
decreasing returns to scale) the weight given to demand
uncertainty is large. The "degree of uncertainty" facing the firm
depends on the specification of technology and demand.
Leaving the aggregation problems to future research, it is
still possible to comment on the results obtained by empirical
research on aggregate and firm data: researchers often relate
investment in a period to average Q (see Hayashi[1982] and his
reference~) or to marginal Q (see Abel and Blanchard[1986]); other
researchers relate the change in the capital stock to the marginal
profitability of installed capital and to the user cost of capital
(see Jorgenson[1963] and Hall[1986]).
If in fact investment is irreversible at a more disaggregate
level, and idiosyncratic shocks are large compared to aggregate
ones (or, equivalently, there is low correlation among the
evolution of business conditions for different firms), empirical
research should be observing the average of distributions similar
to the ones derived in Sections 3 and 4 above, and depicted in
Figures 6 and 7. The distributions derived above are the
steady-state ones: in every period and sector the spread of
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average and marginal Q for individual firms and individual capital
goods will be determined by the history of idiosyncratic shocks,
while the location of the distribution will be determined by the
history of aggregate shocks.
To fix ideas, think of a researcher trying to explain
investment in a sector by the aggregate value (for the sector) of
observables such as ~ (the ratio of marginal profitability of
capital to its purchase price), Q (marginal Q, the ratio of the
m
shadow price of capital to its purchase cost) or QA (average Q,
the ratio of firm's total value to the replacement cost of their
installed capital stock). News affecting the marginal productivity
of capital and/or its price for the whole aggregate will shift the
distribution of ~t: all the individuals that are then brought
*against the investment barrier c will be prevented from crossing
it by a spurt of investment, and the mean of the distribution of
~t will increase. Idiosyncratic shocks will, on the other hand,
simply "stir" or "mix" the distribution of ~t' without affecting
its location: as individual units get pushed against the
*investment barrier c , noisy movements will be generated in the
investment series, movements completely unrelated to aggregate
observables.
It has been shown above that both Q
A
and Q
m
are monotonically
related to ~t if investment is irreversible: then aggregate (over
time, firms and capital goods) Q and Q should be positively
A m
related to the amount of aggregate investment in any given period.
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In practice, researchers (see for example Hoshi and Kashyap[1987]
for average Q; and Abel and Blanchard[1986] for marginal Q19) do
find that Q has a fair amount of explanatory power when investment
is regressed on it, but observe that much of investment's
variability is left unexplained, that variables other than Q enter
significantly in the regression, and that the implied speed of
adjustment to shocks does not make much sense when interpreted in
the framework of the convex-cost-of-adjustment theoretical models
that underly this empirical literature.
Even admitting that costs of adjustment are in fact convex,
there are of course many explanations for the shortcomings of Q's
explanatory power. But it should be noted that investment
irreversibility is consistent with these findings: while in the
aggregate average and marginal Q should be positively related to
investment, there is no presumption that the functional form of
the relationship should be linear or loglinear, nor that no other
variables should be significant in a linear regression. Operating
cash flow, production and sales are also related to investment
(for a given price of capital), since they are positively related
to the m9rginal profitability of installed capital. Moreover, any
variable related to the idiosyncratic shocks affecting individual
firms and regions could well turn out significant in a regression.
19Abel and Blanchard estimate marginal Q via a vector
autoregression, under restrictive assumptions as to the functional
form of the profit function: without a model of aggregation, it is
not possible to tell whether this is appropriate under investment
irreversibility. The strong nonlinearity of the irreversible
investment model would suggest caution.
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Other researchers (see Hall[1977] for an excellent
exposition) have bypassed the convex-cost~of-adjustmentassumption
and, noting that gross investment is never zero in u.s. aggregate
industry data, have obtained the implication that (since condition
[2.2] above applies at all times) the optimal investment policy
should simply sets the marginal productivity of capital equal to
the Jorgenson[1963] user cost of capital. The implied control
policy is not dynamic; such an investment rule has little hope of
fitting the data, unless supplemented by a (largely unexplained)
lag structure in the relationship between the user cost of capital
and investment: such a lag structure could, of course,
inadvertently fit the complex dynamics implied by investment
irreversibility.
Hall[1986] tests empirically the equality of marginal
productivity and rental cost of capital, looking at long-run
averages of the twC) to eliminate the dynamic issues. He finds
that, in the industries he considers, the former is significantly
lower than the latter, and interprets this finding as evidence of
purposeful overinvestment, possibly as an entry deterrent on the
part of incumbent firms, or as evidence of increasing returns. Of
course, both of these explanations may be true in reality; but the
optimality condition tested by Hall does not hold if capital
accumulation is irreversible at the firm level: as shown above,
investment irreversibility implies that in the long run capital's
marginal profitability should be lower than the conventionally
measured user cost of capital, even under constant returns to
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scale, and this may well explain Hall's empirical finding.
6 - Concluding comments
Sections 1 and 2 of this Chapter propose a solution to the
problem of irreversible sequential investment under uncertainty;
choosing Cobb-Douglas technology and constant elasticity demand,
it is possible to solve for the firm's investment rule in closed
form as special case of the problem solved in Chapter 1.
The rule implies that, under uncertainty, the marginal
productivity of capital that triggeres investment is higher than
the conventionally measured cost of capital, because of investment
irreversibility, even though the firm's owners are assumed to be
risk neutral. A~ noted by Pindyck[1986], there is informal
evideuc~ that managers often discount the expected revenues from
an investment project at a rate far higher than the one implied by
any reasonable risk premium: the model considered here shows that,
under certain conditions, this may indeed be very close to the
optimal investment rule.
But the positive implications of investment irreversibility
are very different from its normative implications: although
ex-ante a higher marginal profitability of capital is needed to
trigger investment, suggesting that investment irreversibility
would make production less capital intensive, Section 3 finds that
ex-post the average marginal productivity of capital is lower if
investment is irreversible.
Section 4 derives expressions for observables variables that
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are empirically relevant for the study of the firm; and Section 5
offers preliminary considerations about the empirical relevance of
the results.
It seems likely i~hat most investment projects are
i.rreversible tC) a large extent I and that idiosyncratic uncertainty
is large enough to make the irreversibility constraint important;
but to apply these observations and the model proposed in this
chapter to the study of aggregate investment behavior it will be
necessary to solve complex aggregation and estimation problems,
and to devise realistic and tractable assumptions about the degree
of flexibility in the use of installed capital and about used
capital markets.
Apart from the empirical study of investment, irreversibility
should interest macroeconomists by its interesting implications
for the dynamic behavior of prices, production and employment
across "business cycles". Of course, the stochastic process
assumed above corresponds to a random walk with drift, not to a
stationary process around a deterministic trend, and the "cycles"
would have to be redefined accordingly: in the model above
investment occurs repeatedly, possibly generating a fairly regular
cycle.
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CHAPTER 3
FIRING COSTS AND LABOR DEMAND
(Joint with Samuel Bentolila)
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1- Introduction
High unemployment rates have become the major problem for
most European countries in the 1980s. Several factors are behind
the large increases in unemployment after 1973.
The leading cause of the increase in unemployment after the
first oil price shock was probably the rise in real wages to
levels well above those compatible with full employment.
Contractionary demand policies followed by inflation-fighting,
budget-balancing governments surely bear the main responsibility
for the further rise of unemployment in the 19805.
Nevertheless, certain aspects of the European unemployment
experience suggest that a lack of labor market flexibility may
also have contributed to the worsening of the problem. In
particular, it is frequently argued that the adjustment to market
forces is inhibited by a number of features of the welfare state:
generous unemployment benefits, restrictions on hiring and firing,
restrictions on wage competition, etc. Pervasive state
intervention is thought to have led to rigidified, "Eurosclerotic"
-as dubbed by Giersch[1985]- economies, which could not cope with
the big shocks of the 1970s.
Flexibility (or the lack of it) is an ambiguous concept. We
can distinguish be~ween price and quantity rigidity. The first
refers to the unresponsiveness of the wage level and the sectoral
wage structure to labor market disequiliDria. The second refers to
the lack of labor mobility, the existence of restrictions on
hiring and firing by firms and of regulations on the arrangements
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for the utilization of labor (such as rules on the number of hours
per worker or the length of labor contracts). This Chapter
focusses on the second type of rigidity.
Blanchard et al.[1986] argue that in the high and stable
growth scenario of the 19605 firms could costlessly consent to
tenure and severance pay demands by workers, since employment
growth assured that excess hiring was a mistake of at most a few
months. The change to an environment of low and volatile demand
growth after 1973 then made the severance payments and tenure
arrangements set up in the 1960s very costly for firms. As
Dornbusch[1986] stresses, now taking on a worker is making a
near-irreversible investment: dismissing an employee is very
costly and workers seldom quit because of the slim chances of
find1ng another job. Consequently, firms have become much more
reluctant to hire, for fear of high firing costs in downturns.
From this argument these authors and others have derived the
policy recommendation that European labor markets should be made
more flexible.
This Chapter studies the effects of hiring and, especially,
firing costs on labor demand, with an application to four European
countries. It makes two basic contributions. First, a simple
continuous-time model for a firm's labor demand decision in the
presence of adjustment costs and demand uncertainty is provided.
It includes many of the variables that are often mentioned as
being relevant to the European case. Then, based on the
implications of the model and on results from solving the model
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for realistic parameter values, we argue that changes in firing
costs should not be expected to have large effects on hiring
decisions,nor on the average level of employment; rather, the
dynamic response of employment to exogenous shocks should be
strongly affected by the presence and size of firing costs.
The applicability of the model presented below is limited: it
does not deal with unemployment, but only with employment; it is
just partial equilibrium and it does not consider labor supply,
only labor demand at the level of the firm. In consequence,
statements about aggregate magnitudes cannot be made without
heroic aggregation assumptions. Nevertheless, we argue below that
the application of this model to the European unemployment problem
may still be very relevant.
A final caveat is that we do not consider the rationale for
the presence of firing costs or the larger set of labor market
institutions of which they are a part. In this sense, the
restrictions on dismissals may appear here to be "artificial" (in
Piore's[1986] words). The existence of firing costs presumably
reflects the value attached to employment security, and therefore
any comparison with a world with no ~iring costs may not be very
compelling.
The Chapter is structured as follows. The next section
reviews the nature and evolution of firing costs in Europe in the
recent past, discusses why firing costs may be relevant in
explaining the European employment performance, and briefly
surveys previous literature on the subject. Section 3 introduces
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the model and discusses its implications, both in terms of the
marginal propensities to hire and fire, and of average labor
demand. In section 4 we attempt to interpret the European
experience by solving the model for realistic parameter values and
by looking at the effect of firing costs on the dynamics of labor
demand and on its long run average. Section 5 concludes.
2- Facts and Motivation
a) Firing costs in Europe:
The main component of firing costs in many European countries
is the legal regulation of dismissals. Individual dismissal
legislation protects workers from being "unfairly" fired. The
underlying notion is that the employment relationship is ~ermanent
and so a dismissal is fair only if caused by the employee's gross
misconduct or lack of qualifications or by economic reasons
(redundancy). While the first category allows for summary
dismissal without compensation, the latter involve the following
procedures: prenotification to workers, their representatives and
government agencies, consultation with workers' representatives,
rights of appeal of the employer's decision to labor courts, and
severance payments. All these are avoided if the worker quits,
except in Italy, where severance payments are paid regardless of
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whether the worker is fired or quits. 1
The period of notice usually increases, ~mong other things,
with the length of service, which also determines how many months'
wages is the severance payment. If the dismissal is appealed to
the courts and declared unfair (events which are not very likely,
see Appendix 3) the payment is significantly higher.
Whenever a certain minimum number of workers is dismissed
within a certain period of time, collective dismissal legislation
applies, which basically lengthens notice and consultation
periods.
The burden of these regulations varies among countries. 2 The
ordering from less to more restrictive in the countries we focus
3
on is: United Kingdom, Germany, France and Italy.
Normally very small firms (1 to 19 e~ployees) are exempted
from the employment security laws. 4 Employment in those firms in
France in 1985 was 25.8% of total employment (up from 23.3% in
lwe neglect this issue in what follows, and therefore probably
overestimate the pecuniary cost of firing in Italy in section 4.
We feel justified in doing so since non-monetary firing costs have
been very large in Italy, due to union militancy and social
custom.
2 'For a summary see Piore[1986] or Emerson[1987].
3This ranking is confirmed by a 1985 employer survey by the E.E.C.
(European Economy[1986]) and by data in Lazear[1987]. The Italian
economy, however, may not be so inflexible, given that State
financed temporary layoffs ("Cassa Integrazione Guadagni") are
possible and given the relative importance of the informal sector.
4In Italy, the threshold is 35 workers.
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1979) and 17.2% in Germany5 in 1970 (Sengenberger and
Loveman[1987]); thus the regulations cover firms representing
around 75% of total employment. The actual coverage is, however,
somewhat smaller because newer, part-time and fixed-term contract
employees are also excluded from this legislation.
As to the evolution over time, employment security provisions
in the law anJ in collective agreements were introduced in the
late 19605, mainly induced by the social unrest in those years.
They were then strengthened around 1975 to protect workers against
the income loss caused by unemployment ..Unions also showed a
strong opposition to mass firings. Finally, in the 19805, new laws
-prompted by the concern with labor market inflexibility- have
tried lowered firing costs and allowed for more unstable forms of
employment (see OECD[1986b]), while the attitude of unions towards
dismissals has also eased.
b) The relevance of firing costs:
In order to understand why firing costs can be relevant for
the explanation of the European unemployment experience, it is
necessary to quickly review a few stylized facts. We provide some
data in ~able 1.
51 to 10 employees.
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Table 1: Labor Market Indicators
FRANCE GERMANY ITALY U.K.
1. Unemployment: 1973 2.6 0.8 6.2 3.0
1986 10.3 6.9 10.Sa 11.5
2. Change in part-time
employment 1973-83 3.3 2.1 -2.0 1.7
3. Labor turnover:
Accessions: 1973 22.0b 34.0 33.0 32.0
1984 13.0 25.0c 8.0c 19.0
Separations: 1973 19.0b 33.0 26.0 31.0
1984 14.0 25.0 c 14.0c 21.0
4. Long term unernpl.
1979 30.3 19.9 35.8 24.8
1985 46.8 31.0 47.9d 41.0
5. Youth unemployIraent
1980 15.0 3.9 25.2 14.1
1985 25.6 9.5 33.7 21.7
Notes: (a) 1985; (b) 1971; (c) 1982; (d) 1984.
Sources: (1) Standardized unemployment rates from OECD[1987a],
Table R12; (2) OECD[1985], Table 11; (3) Labor turnover (including
mobility between establishments) in the whole economy -in
manufacturing for France and U.K.- from OECD[1986b], Table II-3,
(4) Persons unemployedfor a year or more from OECD[1986b], Table
K; (5) OECD[1986a], Table 10.
The steady increase in unemployment since 1973 and its
acceleration in the 1980s resulted from a growing labor force and
a flat employment level, the latter being the net outcome of
declining agricultural and industrial employment and a slowly·
rising employment in services. We first describe the employment
composition and ~lows and then those of unemployment.
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In the last fifteen years, new jobs in Europe have had two
characteristics: they have been created mainly by small firms and
(except in Italy) they are part-time. Also, labor turnover rates
-for both accessions and separations- have fallen considerably.
There are no data on quits (except for Italy), but the available
information points to a fall in both the quit and the layoff rate.
The composition of unemployment has shifted towards the
unskilled, the young and the long term unemployed. With regard to
the flows in and out of unemployment, the former have
-surprisingly- grown modestly while the latter have dramatically
decreased. As shown by Flanagan[1987] , the likelihood of entering
unemployment has not changed very much but the probability of
finding a job once unemployed has sharply declined.
The review of these facts reveals that European unemployment
is not a problem of excessive job destruction but of lack of job
creation, so that any theory needs to explain why firms have
become more reluctant to hire and/or why the unemployed have
become choosier about jobs.
The interest in firing costs comes from their consistency
with those stylized facts. The change to a bleaker outlook after
1973 made firms want to stop hiring and to dismiss more. But the
increase in firing costs around 1975 would make them fire much
less and alSo hire less, hence the dramatic fall in turnover and
the stagnant employment level.
Second, as pointed out by Krugman[1987], with low flows into
and out of jobs, both the duration of unemployment and youth
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unemployment have to increase. Finally, jobs not covered by
employment protection legislation should increase at the expense
of those covered by it. Hence the rise in small-firm, part-time
and fixed-term contract jobs.
c) Survey of the previous literature:
The quasi-fixity of labor has been recognized by economists
for a long time, starting with the seminal work of Oi[1962j.
Adjustment costs have usually been modeled as being strictly
convex and, more specifically, quadratic;6 then, since faster
adjustment is increasingly costly, the reaction to any shock takes
place over a prolongued period of time.
On the one hand, the convexity assumption is hardly ever
justified in the literature. Holt et al.[1960] say it is a
"tolerable approximation over a range". It is normally used for
ease of computation: the linear-quadratic framework yields
certainty equivalence. As the model we present below makes clear,
this simplification leaves out an important aspect of a firm's
optimization problem: the degree of uncertainty about the future
is in reality one of the main determinants of a firm's employment
policy.
On the other hand, with employment protection laws the main
source of firing costs in Europe today, it seems that a fixed cost
per employee is a better approximation to reality (as noted in
Nickell[1987]). Therefore we use linear asymmetric adjustment
6For example Holt et al.[1960], Solow[1968] or Sargent[1978].
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costs in our model. 7
Some theoretical work has been devoted to model labor demand
with linear adjustment costs. Some models, in continuous time,
ignore uncertainty: Kemp and Wan[1974] , Nickell[1978, 1987] and
Leban and Lesourne[1980]: the latter two study the implications of
such costs on labor demand over the cycle. There are papers that
do consider uncertainty in discrete time: Caplin and Krishna[1986]
study the optimality of the labor demand rule with discrete Markov
shocks and Gavin[1986] has a three-period model with only firing
costs and serially correlated shocks to the marginal product.
Kelsey[1986] and Bentolila[1987] present infinite-horizon models
with uncertainty arising from serially independent shocks. In this
Chapter we model in continuous time the labor demand decision of a
firm subject to nonstationary demand uncertainty.
On the empirical side, apart from the work on quadratic costs
in the U.s.,8 Hamermesh[1987] shows that while the quadratic and
the fixed adjustment costs models cannot be distinguished at the
aggregate level, the latter performs much better at the individual
plant level. Burda[1986] estimates a model with linear and
quadratic adjustment costs, finding the latter non-significant in
several European countries. Finally, Burgess and Dolado[1987]
7It would·be~possible to solve the model under the assumption that
hiring and/or firing entails a fixed cost, independent of the
number of workers involved (the techniques in Harrison et
al.[1983] could be adapted for this purpose). This is certainly
realistic at the firm level, and generates (S,s)-type employment
policies which are the very opposite of the optimal policies under
convex costs of adjustment.
8For example Sargent[1978], Kennan[1979], Pindyck and
Rotemberg[1983] or Shapiro[1986].
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estimate, for U.K. manufacturing, a model of variable quadratic
costs of changing output and find them significant. We present no
econometrics here, but perform some simulations on our model, with
realistic parameter values, in section 4 below.
3- A simple model of firing costs
In this section we propose a model of dynamic labor demand
under uncertainty, and we briefly illustrate the solution
technique.
a) Problem setup:
Consider a firm with a linear constant returns to scale
production technology, that uses only homogeneous labor, L, as a
factor of production, and faces a constant elasticity demand
function:
[1]
[2] o < ~ < 1
where Qt denotes production and sales at instant t (inventories
are ignored), P t is the product price and ~ is the inverse of the
markup factor, so that the firm's monopoly power decreases when ~
rises. At is labor productivity, which is assumed to grow at a
deterministic exponential rate ~ .
a
The position of the (direct) demand function depends on an
index Zt' which evolves in continuous time as a geometric Brownian
motion with constant mean growth rate ~ and standard deviation a:
[3]
119
where Wt is a standard Wiener process. From [3], demand is
expected to grow at exponential rate ~, but fluctuates randomly so
that the outlook further and further in the future is increasingly
uncertain.
The firm pays a wage, 9w , to its workers and it also bears
labor adjustment costs: a hiring cost, H, per new employee and a
firing cost, F, per dismissed worker. However, if the worker
leaves voluntarily, the firm bears no firing cost. 10 The
instantaneous exponential attrition rate is o.
Since the marginal revenue from a ~onstant elasticity demand
function is always positive, equation [1] holds with equality and,
1-11 J1from [1] and [2], revenues are equal to Zt (AtLt ) ·
The firm chooses an employment and pricing policy to maximize
its value, defined as the expected present value of its cash flow
over the infinite future:
where X is a cumulative labor turnover process (dX>O means hiring,
9The wage is assumed constant for simplicity. It would be possible
to allow for a stochastic ~age (a geometric Brownian motion
process) and use the technique proposed in Chapter 1, as long as
firing and hiring costs were proportional to the current level of
the wage.
10As stated above, this is not appropriate for Italy. If capital
markets function well, severance payments like the Italian ones
can be simply modeled in this framework as part of the wage.
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dX<O means firing), r is given rate of return and 1{.) is the
indicator- function. By the usual feasible perturbation argument,
in which the currently marginal worker -allowing for attrition- is
viewed as the marginal worker through the infinit~ future, the
following first order conditions can be derived (see Chapter 1):
{JOO[ [ZT ] 1-11 ] - (r+o) (T-t) }[4a] E ~A ---- e dT =t t TAL
T T
w
r+o
- F
[4b]
w
r+O {Jro [ [ZT Jl-Jl ] - (r+o) ('r-t) }- F < E ~A ---- e dT <t 'rt ATLT w + Hr+O
if dX =0t
[4c]
- (r+O) (T-t) }
e dT =
w
r+O
+ H
These conditions are easily interpreted. When firing, in
[4a], the firm equates the discounted expected marginal revenue
product (MRP) given up by dismissing a worker to the discounted
wage cost saved from doing so, minus the dismissal cost paid
today. When hiring, in [4c], the firm equates the discounted
expected MRP that the newly hired worker will provide to the
discounted wage cost plus the hiring cost today.
If there were no adjustment costs, the firm would hire
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whenever the expected MRP at the existing labor force was higher
than the future discounted wage cost, and it would fire otherwise.
The equations in [4] would then collapse to the simple rule that
the MRP be at all times equal to the wage. However, with
adjustment costs such a policy is not optimal since it implies a
high turnover, which is now costly. Therefore, the firm does not
necessarily hire immediately if demand picks up, since there are
current hiring costs and future expected firing costs. Conversely,
it is also more cautious before firing after a demand slowdown due
to current firing and future expected hiring costs.
This reasoning explains condition [4b], i.e. a range or
"corridor"ll around the no-cost-of-adjustment labor demand, where
inaction (dXt=O) is optimal. This is shown in Figure 1.
To decide its labor demand, the firm has to calculate the
expectation of the MRP in the future, which will in turn depend on
its employment policy. Concavity of the revenue function makes the
conditions in [4] sufficient as well as necessary to identify the
unique optimal employment policy.
With the assumptions laid out above,12 the optirr.al policy is
simple: allow the MRP to fluctuate between a lower (l) and an
upper (a) control barrier, which are constant (see below}. If the
MRP goes below!, dismiss workers so as to raise the MRP to ~; if
llLeijonhufvcd[1973] coined this word in a different context.
Dornbusch [1987] uses the term in the sense we do here.
12The crucial simplifying assumption is the independence over time
of demand increments. Otherwise, the barriers would be
state-dependent.
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it goes above a, hire new employees to bring the MRP back down to
(1,.
There are two equivalent ways to characterize the rule just
described. First, for a given demand level Zt' there exist two
boundary labor force levels, LF and LH, which satisfy [4a] and
[4c], respectively (see Figure 1). Suppose the firm has a given
labor force inherited from the previous period, LIe If L1 is
higher than LF the firm will fire down to LF ; if L1 is lower than
LH it will hire up to LH; for L1 between LH and LF it will keep
LIe
A second interpretation is to take the current labor force as
given and define two boundary demand index levels, zF and zH'
which make [4a] and [4c] hold true, respectively. For all values
of Zt below zF the firm will fire, for values above zH it will
hire and for Zt between zF and zH it will stay put.
b) Solution of the model:
The task at hand is to find the optimal resetting points a
and l, as a function of the parameters. It is possible to show (by
Ito's lemma, see e.g. Harrison[1985]) that the MRP follows a
geometric Brownian motion when neither hiring nor firing is laking
place:
with drift m - ~~ +(1-~) (~+6-~U2/2) and instantaneous standard
a
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deviation s = (l-p)a. The optimal labor demand policy just
described implies that the firm regulates (in the sense of
Harrison[1985]) the MRP process, not allowing it to go below ~, or
above a.
It is then possible to compute the discounted expectation of
the MRP appearing in the first order conditions, as a special case
(nonstochastic adjustment costs) of the general problem in Chapter
1; the following is proved in Appendix 1 to this Chapter:
be a regulated geornetri~
Brownian motion, with starting value ijO at time 0, upper control
barrier at a and lower, control barrier at ~; then,
{Iro -At
; 11 0 ,a,.e}EO 011 t e dt =
a
1 ( aa2 .ea 2J a 2 ( a
a
1
a
J.e - - a l.e
"'0 71 0 a 71 0
.e
= + +
:l-m
(aUi
u
2 a 2 aiJ (a a a aJ{A-m)u1 .e - {l. .e (A-m)a2 a i.e 2 -a 2.e 1
where a 1 and a 2 are (respectively) the positive and negative roots
of the equation (8 2 /2) u2 + (m - 8 2 /2) a - A = O.
We can now insert the expectation of the MRP (a highly
nonlinear expression in a and~) into the conditions in [4], which
then read:
w
[4al f(..f,fL,.f m,s,r+6) = - F
r+6
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[4c]
w
f(a,a,~ ; m,s,r+O) = + H
r+6
If F = H = 0, then it is possible to show that u = l = w
solves [4a,c]. If F ~ w/(r+O) then hiring decisions are
effectively irreversible (firing is never optimal), and a closed
form solution can be found as in Chapter 2. But in general it
is not possible to solve in closed form, and so the two equations
have to be solved numerically. Once a and ~ are known, the
corresponding hiring and firing points for labor (LH and LF ) as a
function of the strength of demand, Zt' and productivity, At' can
be found by inverting the MRP: this completely describes the
firm's dynamic labor demand policy.
We are also interested in finding out where, between the
barriers, is a firm likely to be at any point in time. It is
possible to derive the steady-state distribution of the MRP
between ~ and e13 , along the lines described in Chapter 2. Appendix
1 shows that the ergodic density function of the MRP is a power
function (the logarithm of the MRP is exponentially distributed) ,
with mean given by the following nonlinear function of ~ and ~:
2
[ ~~ ] [ :~ ]
[ m -ms /2] 4J, .eT/ = [ 2m -1) [ :~ -1)2S
a - .e
13Labor demand does not possess a steady-state distribution, since
the demand index is nonstationary.
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Of course, since a and ~ are not in closed form, we have to
resort to the numerical calculation of the ergodic mean.
It is also possible to solve the dynamic optimization problem
of the firm by marginal option valuation. When hiring a worker,
the firm is exercising a call option: the option to purchase (at a
price equal to the worker's discounted wage bill, plus a hiring
cost) a package containing an asset which pays dividends equal to
the currently marginal worker's MRP, and a put option to sell the
same asset (at a price equal to the worker's discounted wage bill,
minus the firing cost). When firing a worker the firm engages in
the symmetric operation: it sells the asset-cum-put-option package
and receives the call option. The optimal timing for these
operations can be derived by arbitrage arguments, and it can be
shown that the resulting employment program is the same as that
derived by the dynamic programming arguments above. 14
The analysis below focusses on how the boundary labor levels
LH and LF and the average labor demand depend on the firing cost,
and also on how the other parameters in the model affect such
dependence.
In what follows it will be assumed that firing costs are
significantly larger than hiring costs, as seems to be the case in
Europe (see section 4 and Appendix 3).
~4See Chapter 1. The model in this Chapter is isomorphic to the
general problem considered there, with Pt=H+w/(r+d) for all t and
Pt=-F+w/(r+o) for all t.
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c) Effects of a reduction in firing costs:
We now study the effects of a decrease in dismissal costs. 15
This is an exercise in comparative dynamics, since we are not
allowing for parameter changes when we solve the firm's problem:
we are comparing unrelated economies, each endowed with a set of
immutable parameter values.
A fall in F makes both current and future firing less
expensive. This makes future firing more likely and, through a
reduced likelihood of inaction, future marginal profits are more
heavily discounted. The narrowing of the corridor makes the
expected time elapsed before hitting a barrier decrease. In the
first order conditions in [4] these effects appear in the marginal
revenue product process and workers' expected tenure length.
For firing decisions (so that [4a] applies), the fall in the
cost of dismissing implies that the expected MRP of the marginal
worker has to be higher, i.e., the firm fires more. The magnitude
of this effect is large, since the current firing cost is neither
uncertain nor discounted.
The impact of a fall in F on hiring decisions is not
immediate from equation [4c], and so we rewrite it with F
appearing explicitly. Define T (a random variable as of time t) as
the first firing time after hiring time t. Then, by an application
of the strong Markov property of Brownian motions (see Appendix 2)
equation [4c] becomes:
15For a detailed exposition of the discrete time case, see
Bentolila[1987].
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[4c' ]
= H +
w
r+o [ { -<r+6) (T-t)}] {-<r+6)(T-t)}l-Et e + F Et e
This equation has a fairly intuitive interpretation: the firm
will hire a worker when the marginal revenue he is expected to
provide before he is fired (or quits) equals the hiring cost plus
the present value of his wages while in the firm, plus the firing
cost at the (random) firing time T, discounted to the present. The
latter is the "shadow hiring cost" component of firing costs,
which shows that the existence of such costs inhibits hiring.
The reduction in firing costs is the fall in F in the right
hand side; but it also shortens workers' expected tenure, (EtT-t) I
which affects all the other terms in [4c']. More specifically,
since r+o)O, it increases the discount factor multiplying the
firing cost F, reduces that multiplying the wage cost and it also
decreases the number of periods over which the MRP is taken into
account.
The total effect is positive, i.e. a decrease in firing costs
will make the firm less reluctant to hire: but the larger F the
smaller is this effect. The reason is that the larger F, the
longer is expected tenure (EtT is higher), and the smaller is the
discount factor multiplying F <i.e. closer to zero), and so a
given reduction in F will not reduce the right hand side of [4c']
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as much. Thus, the increase in labor demand will be smaller too.
The implication is that a reduction in firing c~sts need not
have a significant effect on the propensity to hire, while -as
shown above- it will definitely increase the propensity to fire.
On the other hand, the propensity to hire is very much affected by
hiring costs, which are not explicitly dealt with in this section.
Figure 2 shows the asymmetry in the impact of F on the labor
demand boundaries (in terms of the MRP, the graph would be the
mirror image, i.e. a -which corresponds to LH- would slightly
increase while i would strongly decrease). The dashed line is the
steady-state mean of labor demand for a given value of the demand
index z. For the realistic parameters values used in the Figure,
the size of firing cost has practically no influence on average
steady-state employment, which is however slightly higher if
firing costs are large. Similar computations reveal that average
labor demand is a strongly increasing function of firing costs if
the attrition rate 0 and the growth rate a are small, and the
uncertainty parameter a is large.
Figure 3 compares the steady-state distribution of the MRP
(derived in Appendix 1) for economies with different firing costs.
In the absence of both hiring and firing costs, the MRP has a
degenerate distribution: it is a spike at w=l. Small adjustment
costs (in this case F) already cause the distribution to spread
out considerably. Higher F means that in bad times the firm will
be less willing to fire and so the likelihood of observing lower
values of the MRP (higher employment) increases, apd that is why
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the mean of L increases in Figure 2.
The distribution is strongly skewed towards the hiring
barrier because there is a natural tende~cy to hire if,
realistically, the demand growth and attrition rates are positive.
Thus the probability of a dismissal is quite low already at
moderate firing cost levels. This explains the lack of a
discernible effect on the hiring boundary in Figure 2, and makes
the large rise in the firing boundary relatively unimportant: once
firing costs are large, the firm will very seldom be near the
firing barrier.
c) Comparative dynamics:
Once the effects of adjustment costs on labor demand are
known, it is interesting to ask how other parameters enhance or
dampen their impact. Again this is an exercise in comparative
dynamics, i.e. we study the behavior of firms facing different
environments but we do not model the firms' raaction to changes in
the parameters.
An increase in the mean growth rate of demand, ~, reduces the
probability of future desired firing and increases that of future
hiring. Workers' expected tenure increases, making firing costs
less important (but hiring costs more important). This raises
expected marginal profits and thus raises both boundary labor
levels, LF and LH (see Figure 4). As ~ rises, the firm is more
likely to be near the hiring barrier, therefore the distribution
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skews towards LH and so does its mean (dashed line in the graph) .16
The effect of an increase in the rate of productivity growth,
is qualitatively similar to that of demand growth: both
~ ,
a
productivity and demand growth increase revenues (although price
and quantity are affected differently).
When the variance of demand, a 2 , increases, the likelihood of
large changes in the demand index rises, so that the firm would be
likely to dismiss and hire more often, and both types of
adjustment costs become more important. This discourages both
hiring and firing, and the corridor opens up on both sides in
Figure 5: the firm will start firing at a higher LF and hiring at
a lower LH• With Iowa, F higher than H and positive growth and
attrition, the distribution is skewed towards hiring. As a
increases, the distribution spreads out and so the mean shifts
towards the firing barrier (dashed line in the graph).
An increase in the attrition rate, 6, works very much like
demand growth (Figure 4), making firing costs less relevant
(workers leave voluntarily more often) but hiring costs more
important (there are more quits to replace and train); i.e. both
L d L · 17 A·· k h·· l-k 1 f thF an H 1ncrease. ttr1t10n rna es 1r1ng more 1 e y or e
firm; the mean shifts towards LH and is lower the higher is the
16This is a statement about the steady-state distribution of the
MRP: the picture depicts labor demand for a given Z value. Of
course, an economy with higher a will have higher labor demand
over time as Z will grow faster.
17If H is high enough, LH may fall, as a function of 5, over a
range of high attrition rates.
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attrition rate.
A rise in the required rate of return, r, also ~owers the
weight of future profits, so the impact is like that of an
increase in o.
Finally, consider an increase in ~, the inverse of the markup
factor, i.e. a reduction of the firm's monopoly power. This
reduces the elasticity of the profit function to employment: the
marginal profit curve is flatter. In addition to supplying more
output for any given value of Zt (i.e. the labor demand mean moves
towards the hiring barrier), the firm is not very much hurt by
deviations of employment from the no-frictions optimum, and the
corridor widens.
The combined effects of all parameters are hard to gauge. But
the most interesting interaction is the one between the magnitude
of firing costs and the degree of uncertainty about the future
evolution of demand, which is illustrated in Figure 6: firing
costs are more relevant the more uncertain is the firm's outlook.
The main contribution of the model proposed in this section is the
explicit treatment of uncertainty and dynamics.
4- Numerical solution of the model
a) The two regimes:
We now solve the simple model laid out in the preceding
section, for realistic parameter values, in an attempt to quantify
the effects of firing costs in the European experience.
We take the first oil price shock as a watershed between two
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distinct "regimes". Before 1973 demand growth was quick and
steady, productivity growth was high and workers were not afraid
of quitting, because jobs could easily be found. In contrast,
after 1973 demand growth became low and more volatile,
productivi,ty slowed down and workers became reluctant to qui t
because of the difficulty in finding jobs. Finally, around 1975,
labor security provisions were tightened by governments and unions
trying to avoid massive dismissals.
We define the years from 1961 to 1973 as the first regime and
1975 to 1986 as the second regime. 18 Table 2 shows the sample
period averages for the two regimes. ~ and a are obtained from the
industrial production index. a is equal to three times the
standard deviation for the industrial sector as a whole, as a way
to capture the fact that firms suffer from idiosyncratic shocks
that are averaged out in the aggregate data (for the U.S., this
has been documented by Romer[1987] at the industry level). The
estimate of 6 comes from several sources19 and we derive rough
proxies for F from the legislation and actual data (see Appendix
3) .20· With two exceptions (0 in Germany and &a- productivity growth
- in U.K.) the stylized facts are confirmed by the data.
18We exclude the year 1974 to have a clean separation of regimes.
19In Italy, the drop in 6 might be exaggerated, since 6 corresponds
to firms with 10 workers or more in Regime 1 and with 50 workers
or more in Regime 2, and there is evidence showing that labor
tttrnover is highest in small firms in Italy, see Contini and
Revelli[1987].
20In the absence of enough data on the rise of F, we set it to one
third.
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Table 2: Parameter values
*Regime
FRANCE
1 2
GERMANY
1 2
ITALY
1 2
U.KINGDOM
1 2
{J
o
{J
a
F
5.5 0.7 4.8 1.4 6.2 1.2 2.9 1.0
6.5 12.4 11.4 10.5 10.0 16.2 8.6 11.6
12.7 7.9 22.0 14.1 14.7 6.5 22.7 12.7
4.9 2.0 4.6 2.9 5.1 2.4 3.4 3.7
.687 .916 .562 .750 .812 1.083 .187 .250
Other parameter values: r=15, ~=.6, H= 1 month's wages (i.e .. 083).
Notes: Parameters are in percentage terms, at annual rate; hiring
and firing costs are in terms of years of wages (see Appendix 3).
* 1=1961 to 1973, 2=1975 to 1986.
The results we are about to present should be taken with
caution. First, ~, a and ~a are calculated from production and
-for ~ - employment, which are the net result of endogenous
a
decisions of all firms in the industrial sector.
Second, for complete realism we should consider many sources
of uncertainty (such as energy prices, exchange rates, and
monetary and fiscal policy), and allow the firm to h~ve several
sources of flexibility, such as the substitution of capital or
materials for labor, the use of overtime, temporary layoffs or
subcontracting, and the management of inventories. We think,
however, that industrial production summarizes a firm's stochastic
environment sufficiently well for the exercise performed here, and
we subsume all the firm's flexibility in the single parameter ~,
which determines the instantaneous revenue function's elasticity
to employment.
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Third, legally mandated firing costs started to go down early
in the U.K. (1979) and Italy (1980), so that our regime 2 was in
these two countries much shorter than we assume. Finally, we have
not calibrated the results with the (very scarce) available data
on tenure lengths: with firing costs as large as those reported in
the table, firms should very seldom fire in our model, and this
mayor may not be confirmed by the data.
Let us focus on the effects of the regime change on the
boundary levels LH and LF , shown in Table 3. The changes in ~, ~a
and, especially, a lower the hiring boundary LH, i.e. firms have a
lower labor force before they start hiring. The reason for the
di.?erging impact of 0 is that lower attrition makes hiring costs
matter less.
On the other hand, the reductions in ~, ~a and 6 make LF
fall. With lower expected demand and productivity growth, and less
quitting, firms start firing sooner. The increase in volatility
(0) makes firms be more cautious, so this (small) effect goes in
the opposite way, as does the increase in F, which is the single
most important determinant of LF .
The effects on the hiring barrier are smaller than those on
the firing barrier. This is reasonable since the fall in ~, ~a and
6 all make firing costs more important and hiring costs less
relevant. Still, the effect of higher uncertainty and lower growth
on the hiring boundary is far from negligible: in France and
Italy, where firing costs are more important, the change in the
parameters induces a 4-7% lower marginal desired employment in our
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model, with the wage and the demand level given. Although we do
not model the supply side of the labor market, and real wage
stickiness is of course necessary for any unemployment pattern to
be observed, this increased reluctance to hire can probably
explain the prolonged high levels of unemployment even in the
comparatively strong economic environment of the 19805: this is
precisely the point stressed by Blanchard et a1.[1986].
The steady-state average labor demand is hardly affected by
the parameter changes, except marginally for the variance and more
importantly for the at~rition rate. The .combined effect is an
increase in the mean: firms are on average closer to the firing
barrier in regime 2 than in regime 1 (the percentage changes are:
France, 1.8%, Germany, 1.7%: Italy, 4%; and U.K., 2.2%).
Table 4 shows the effects of the change in regime on the
marginal revenue product boundaries a and !. This figures are
interesting because, by reversing their sign, they show by how
much would the wage have to fall to induce hiring or firing at the
same point as before the regime change, other things (such as
demand strength) equal. Finally, Table 5 shows the effects of
different percentage decreases in firing costs on the boundary
labor levels once the economy is in regime 2. It confirms our
previous assertion that a change in firing costs strongly affects
the propensity to fire but not the propensity to hire.
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Table 3: Effects of the change in regime on LF and LH (%)
u. KINGDOM
LH LF
o
o
it
a
F
All
-0.2 -10.4 -0.2 -5.8 -0.4 -11.0 -0.1 -2.1
-2.1 0.1 0.3 -0.0 -2.8 0.1 -1.0 0.1
0.8 -14.7 1.0 -19.2 1.0 -26.8 1.5 -12.4
-0.2 -9.4 -0.2 -4.4 -0.3 -9.0 0.0 0.5
0.0 32.1 0.0 35.3 0.0 43.7 0.0 11.5
-4.3 -17.3 • 8 -10.9 -6.8 -27.8 -0.2 -6.5
Table 4: Effects of the change in regime on MRPF and MRPH (%)
(J
o
(J
a
F
All
0.1 4.5 0.1 2.4 0.1 4.8 0.0 0.9
0.9 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 1.1 -0.0 0.4 -0.0
-0.3 6.6 -0.4 9.0 -0.4 13.3 -0.6 5.5
0.1 4.0 0.1 1.8 0.1 3.8 -0.0 -0.2
0.0 -10.5 0.0 -11.4 0.0 -13.5 0.0 -4.3
1.8 7.9 -0.3 4.7 2.9 13.9 0.1 2.7
Table 5: Regime 2- Effects of a fall in firing costs on LF and LH (%)
10%
20%
50%
0.0 -7.6 0.0 -8.3 0.0 -8.5 0.0 -3.2
0.0 -14.5 0.0 -16.0 0.0 -16.2 0.0 -6.3
0.0 -32.6 0.0 -35.7 0.0 -35.9 0.0 -15.5
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The parameter values in the previous subsection are, at most,
ballpark figures, and correspond to the whole industrial sector.
There may be measurement errors, and individual sectors behave
differently from the aggregate. In providing parameter values for
our solutions, we have tried to get reasonable estimates of
firm-level uncertainty and flexibility. The behavior of sectoral
employment depends on these parameters in a somewhat loose way,
but we leave the treatment of aggregation for future research.
Also, while demand for industrial products has been growing on
average, some industrial subsectors' production has been steadily
declining. Therefore, while the average growth and attrition we
find allow for infrequent firing, negative growth (which is
usually accompanied by very low attrition) means that sectoral
firing will occur, and this would not show up in our calculations
above.
Sensitivity analysis was performed to check the robustness of
the results. These are not reported in detail, given the roughness
of the exercise. The main conclusions are: (a) The fall in LH is
very robust to most parameter values, but sensitive to the values
of 0, 6 and H; the fall in L F is quite sensitive to all
parameters, specially to F. (b) If volatility at the firm level is
higher than we assume, LH falls more and LF falls less than in the
baseline, which accords with the European experience (hiring
freeze, not much firing).
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b) - Implications for the European experience:
We now explore the implications of our model for the behavior
of labor demand in Europe. There are two different issues: first,
the change in the steady-state distribution of the MRP inside the
corridor caused by the regime change and, second, the dynamics,
both those caused by movements of z (the fundamental business
conditions) within a regime, and those following the regime
transition ..
Section 3 derived the steady-state distribution of labor's
marginal revenue product: with realistic parameter values, this
distribution is skewed towards the hiring barrier. Out of the
several parameter changes, let us first address the increase in F.
Average long-run labor demand, which is inversely related to
the average MRP, is an increasing function of the magnitude of
firing costs (although the increase is very shallow with realistic
parameter values, it becomes very pronounced if the attrition rate
is small or the demand growth rate is negative). This is at first
sight quite surprising: we are raising firing costs and
keeping the wage fixed, hence increasing the cost of labor, and we
would expect the firm to use labor more sparingly. But firing
costs prevent firing so much more than hiring that they increase
average employment. There is a "ratchet effect" built in the
optimal policy: the firm knows that marginal workers may one day
have a low MRP and/or firing costs will have to be paid, but this
possibility is heavily discounted since hiring occurs in good
times, and bad times are far into the future. Ex-post, firing is
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less likely to occur if firing costs are large, and so average
employment increases -which may be a rationale for workers
organizations' support for severance-pay legislation.
The impact of higher firing costs on the steady-state average
labor demand is almost negligible with the parameters in our Table
2 baselines (which are realistic for the industrial sector of
those European economies). But the effect on the ergodic mean of
the large fall in the attrition rate is high (from 1% in France to
2.1% in the U.K.): in the new environment, firms are much more
reluctant to hire, but now hired workers quit much more rarely.
The positive impact on the long-run mean is also magnified by the
higher degree of uncertainty. In summary, all parameter shifts
tended to lower the average MRP, i.e. raise the mean of labor
demand. Again the interpretation is that firms would in steady
state be likely to be closer to the firing barrier than before.
The latter point, of course, raises the issue of how long it
takes to reach the new steady-state MRP distribution, which leads
to the study of the dynamics implied by the model.
Consider first the dynamic behavior of employment within a
regime: firing costs are clearly not always harmful for
employment. They reduce labor demand in good times (as the firm
requires a higher marginal revenue product to start hiring), but
increase labor demand in bad times. To illustrate this point, in
Figure 7 employment histories of economies with different firing
costs are plotted for the same exogenous demand path. The
implication is that adjustment of employment to exogenous shocks
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is more sluggish in an economy with high firing costs.
From our results it should be clear that large firing costs
do not decrease long-run average levels of employment: rather, the
employment performance of economies where firing costs are large
should be dynamically different. The results in Gordon[1987]
provide some empirical support for this view: the ranking of the
four countries we analyze in terms of the size of the labor input
response to output movements is inversely related to their ranking
in terms of firing cost magnitude. Moreover, the slow speed of
adjustment of labor repeatedly found by researchers (see
Nickel1[1987]) may not be reflecting a smooth path originated by
quadratic adjustment costs (as usually assumed) but the inaction
of firms inside the corridor.
We can then discuss the dynamics implied by a regime change:
what happens if a large, aggregate negative shock occurs, and at
the same time the parameters of the stochastic process and the
firing costs are suddenly and unexpectedly changed, as we think
was the case in the early 1970s?
Assuming that by that time firms were distributed between the
barriers according to the steady-state distribution (shaped like
the ones plotted in Figure 3), most firms would be close to the
hiring barrier. In the aftermath of the first oil price shock, the
negative change in fundamentals (demand, wages) would shift the
whole distribution towards the firing barrier, but only a very
small number of firms would immediately fire, given the
concentration near the hiring barrier and the higher firing cost.
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It is not possible to verify this implication since dismissals are
not distinguished from quits in official data, but casual
empiricism suggests that labor shedding by large European firms
was in fact very small during the 1970s. Thus, given a
slowly-adjusting real wage, employment would had certainly been
lower in Europe had high firing costs not prevented firms from
shedding redundant workers.
Since the bulk of firms that used to be close to the hiring
point before the oil shock were carried far from it by the
negative change in fundamentals, and the hiring barrier itself was
shifted away, in the ensuing years most firms would find their
labor force too high and would just let attrition reduce it. Even
though idiosyncratic uncertainty would be smoothing the
distribution of firms within the new barriers, given the sharply
reduced quit rate it took a long time to bring any firms close to
the hiring barrier. Some firms, on the other hand, were firing.
Changes in aggregate business conditions (demand and real wages)
were in the meantime moving the center of the distribution between
the new hiring and firing barriers; but the mild recovery of the
1980s was, in this framework, not large enough to bring a
significant number of firms to the hiring barrier.
Taking a more general view, are firing costs to blame for the
European malaise of the last fifteen years? Without a general
equilibrium model, we clearly cannot draw conclusions about the
welfare effects of firing costs. But labor demand is more stable
if firing costs are large (see Figure 7), and given that wage
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setters may actually trade off lower wages for higher firing
costs, a case could probably be made that firing costs are
beneficial. If demand fluctuations are not due to smoothly
functioning markets but to Keynesian coordination failures, it is
at least conceivable that high firing costs could improve workers'
welfare in a second-best world: they tend to increase employment
in bad times, without appreciably decreasing its long-run average
level. Of course, the lower flexibility of production decreases
profits and the value of the firm, introducing income distribution
issues if the firms' owners are in fact, as a group, distinct from
the workers.
On the other hand, the microeconomic impact of firing
regulations should not be neglected: a rigid employment structure
hampers microeconomic efficiency, as it inhibits reallocation of
labor in response to idiosyncratic demand and productivity shifts;
inasmuch as such intersectoral ~hifts are not transitory,
desirable employment stabilization has in effect to be traded off
· d 8 bI d·· ff8 8 21 W • th taga1nst un eS1ra e pro uct1ve 1ne 1c~ency. e recogn1ze a
such idiosyncratic uncertainty is important when we assume, above,
that uncertainty at the firm level is three times larger than at
the industry level: but we do not have a good aggregative model,
and therefore cannot, for now, address the issue of allocative
21However, Piore[1986] notes that the very existence of dismissal
restrictions can induce firms to search for more flexible uses of
its labor force, thus attaining a higher degree of "dynamic"
efficiency: firms will respond to disturbances by retraining and
redeploying, rather than shedding, their labor force.
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efficiency. Firing costs also hamper productive efficiency when
employers are imperfectly informed about the quality of individual
workers: in particular, European laws make it hard for employers
to dismiss incompetent workers, who are on the other hand the less
likely to quit. This realistic feature should be taken into
account, and it would probably be found that firing would be more
frequent and firms' reluctance to hire would rise.
5- Conclusions
This Chapter proposes an analysis of labor demand in the
presence of linear firing (and possibly hiring) costs, taking
explicit account of dynamics and uncertainty_ In particular, an
attempt is made to characterize the effects of lower expected
growth and higher uncertainty in post-oil shock Europe on a
typical firm's employment policy. We find that such effects are
non1.~egligible. We do not provide a a complete macroeconomic model,
but our model suggests that dynamics and uncertainty must be taken
into consideration when modeling the European unemployment
problem: the highly regulated nature of European labor markets
constrains the flexibility of a firm's employment pOlicies in such
ways that hiring a worker is definitely a risky proposition, and
the degree of uncertainty about the future is a crucial parameter
in the firm's problem.
We also find that the magnitude of firing costs affects the
firing policy of the firm much more dramatically than its hiring
policy. The effect of firing costs depends on the environment. The
fall in growth and productivity and the increase in volatility
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made these costs more important. But as Table 4 forcefully shows,
a mere reduction in firing costs does not significantly increase
firms' marginal propensity to hire while it strongly raises their
willingness to fire. This implication would seem to be confirmed
by the bout of firing in the U.K. in 1980-82, after flexibility
measures were put up starting in 1979 and by the lack of an
appreciable increase in hiring after similar measures were
established in Germany (1985) and France (1986). Therefore, while
it is reasonable to credit firing costs for the avoidance of mass
firings after the first oil shock, it does not seem accurate to
blame them for the European lackluster employment performance in
the 19805. If it is granted that employment stabilization may be
desirable due to macroeconomic distortions, we find that large
firing costs afford more employment stability than small (but
positive) ones, without appreciably affecting the long run level
of employment.
Our model provides, we think, a useful framework for
discussing the effects of institutional constraints on a firm's
employment pOlicies under uncertainty. Much theoretical and
empirical work will be needed to precisely pin down the relevance
of this Chapter's insight, to provide a more realistic model of
the firm, and to extrapolate our results on individual firms to
the macroeconomy. The set of techniques proposed in this Chapter
can be used, for example, to study the economics of marginal
employment subsidies programs (i.e. a reduction in hiring costs) .
The research agenda includes modeling less flexible productive
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t t f th f e 22 t e b d fe •s rue ures or e 1rm, uneer a1nty a out wages an 1r1ng
costs, capital/labor sUbstitution with interrelated employment and
investment policies , aggregation (with attention to idiosyncratic
uncertainty), and especially considering the supply of as well as
the demand for labor, either using a search-theoretic framework or
modeling wage- and firing-cost setting as a bargaining process.
22For example, labor could be used in fixed proportions with
materials in production: such a Leontief production function would
induce the firm to retain idle workers in its payroll during a
demand slump.
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APPENDIX 1: Expectation of controlled geometric Brownian motion
Consider a regulated geometric Brownian motion with control
barriers at a and l, i.e. a stochastic process {ijt l defined by
r; t L t)1 =t
where:
(i) {~tJ is a geometric Brownian motion, with stochastic
differential
d~t = ~t m dt + ~t s dWt
(m and s are real constants, Wt is a standard Brownian motion);
(ii) {UtI and (L t ' are increasing and continuous processes, with
L =U =1:o 0
(iii) {L t } only increases when nt=l, and (UtI only increases when
~t=a, where a and ~ are given positive real numbers;
(iv) ~ s ~t s a for all t~O
Harrison[1985]'s arguments can be adapted to show that these
four properties uniquely identify {UtI and {Lt }; these two
processes maintain ~t within the barriers using the minimum amount
of control, in a well-defined sense.
Let f(.) be a twice continuously differentiable function. Note
that {UtI and {Lt } are processes of finite variation, and apply
Ito's lemma to obtain, after using property (iii) above,
1
df(l1 t )= [ m fl ('7 t )l1 t + : fll(l1t)l1~ ] dt + s fl (l1 t )l1 t dWt +
dL dU
+ l f' (.f) ---! - -a f' (tt) ---!
Lt Ut
Now recall the Integration By Parts formula found in
-AtHarrison[1985], pa~e 73, and apply it to ( f(~t) e to obtain:
~ 2
(Al) e-A.tf(~t) = f(11 0 ) + Je-A.V[mf l (l1 v )l1v + : f"(l1v)l1~ - A.f(1J v )]dlJ
o
- 4J,
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Take the expectation at time 0 of (Al) and let t ~ 00; provided
that f(~t) is bounded and the following conditions hold:
[*] .t. f' (.f) = 0
[**] a f I (a) = 0
the result is
00 2
(A2) 0 = f('l]fO) + Eo{Joe-;\'V[mf t ('l]fv)'l]fv + : ftt('l]fv)'l]f~ - ;\.f('l]fv)]dV}
Now if a function f(.) is found such that
2
s 2
(A3) -TIll = mf' (71 ) 71 + - f" (71 ) 71 -;\. f (71 )
.., v v 2 ZJ z; v
and [*], [**l are satisfied, then rearranging (A2) gives
(A4) f(x) = EO{ J: e-;\.t 'l]ft dt 'l]fo = x }
The general solution "to differential equation (A3) is
(AS) f ('l]f) = -=-- [ 'l]f + B1 'l]fat + P'2 'l]fa:A ]A-m
with
Q.1 -
2
S
) 0
<12=
2
S
< 0
where B1 and B2 are constants of integration to be determined by
the boundary conditions. Conditions [*l and [**l form a system of
two linear equations in 81 and 8 2 , with solution
aa2 t _ ~ la2 a la1 _ aU1 l
Using these values in (AS), and recalling (A4), the result
stated in the main text is proved.
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Now we turn to the steady-state distribution of the MRP.
Harrison [1985, page 90] derives the steady state distribution for
linear regulated Brownian motion: if (~t} is a Brownian motion
with drift H and standard deviation L, regulated at 0 and b>O,
i. e. :
o ~ ~t ~ b d~t= M dt + L dWt
d~ = 0t
if 0 < ~t < b
if ~t=O or ~t=b
then in steady-state it has the following (truncated exponential)
cumulative distribution function:
0
2M ]exp ( 1: 2 ~ - 1
F (~] =
( 2M ]exp 1: 2 b - 1 .
1
~<o
b<~
Noting now that ln (ijt/l ) follows a linear regulated Brownian
motion with drift M=m-s~/2 and standard deviation S, regulated at
o and at b=lnl a / l), it is easy to derive the steady-state
distribution of ~t:
prob(ijSX] = prob(ln(ijt/l)Sln(x/l )] =
x < .e0
:3[(2m/s ) -1]
(x/ l ) - 1
= 2[(2m/s ) -1]
(ull)
- 1
1 U < x
The steady-state density of ~, the marginal revenue product, is
then
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( :~ -1) ~ [ 2~ -2]71 s 1( t s 11 sa]£(71)= [ :~ -1] 2m( -1]2s
u t
and simple integration gives the following expression for the
ergodic mean of the marginal revenue product process:
2
[ :~ ) [ :~ )
( m -mS 12) -a .f11 = [ :~ -1) [ :~ -1)
fJ,
- .e.
APPENDIX 2: Derivation of equation [4c']
First rewrite equation [4c] in the text as:
{A7)
w
r+O
For the next step, recall the Strong Markov Property of
(controlled) Brownian motions (see e.g. Harrison[1985]):
Strong Markov Property: Let {Zt} be a (regulated, geometric)
Brownian motion process and let T be a stopping time (the Brownian
motion attains for the first time a predetermined value at T).
Then the random variable T and the stochastic process {z:t>T} are
independent.
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It is then possible to separate the second term on the left
hand side in (A7) into the product of two expectations:
rearranging and taking iterated expectations (recall that t<T) we
get:
(AS)
w
=
r+O
{IT [ [ZT J1-11] - (r+0) (T - t ) }E PA ---- e dT =t t TAL
T T
(I)
{
- (r+O) (T-t)1 {{J [ (~J l-J..l] - (r+o) (T-T)
Et e ~ Et ET ~A~ eJ T ATLT
Since T is by assumption a firing time, by eq. [4a] in the main
text we get:
(A9)
w
r+6
- F
dX <0
SUbstituting the (nonstochastic) right hand side of (A9) into
(AS), [4c] is finally reduced to [4c ' ] in the text.
APPENDIX 3: Parameter values for the solution baseline
Here we explain the procedures and sources for the baseline
parameter values for the solution of the model in the text.
A) Parameters other than hiring and firing costs:
t: Average percentage change in the first differences of the
logarithm of the index of indu~trial production (IFS tape).
a: Three times the average standard deviation of the first
differences of the logarithm of the index of industrial production
(International Financial Statistics (IFS) tape).
S: France (manufacturing) and Germany (whole economy): Two
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third$ and one half of the separations rate (for the years
available) in regimes 1 and 2, respectively (to capture the
procyclical behavior of quits): from OECD[1986b]. Italy (industry:
after 1976 firms with at least 50 employees): Dell'Aringa[1987].
U.K. (whole economy): Burgess and Nickell[1987l.
~a: Average difference between the change in the first
differences of the logarithm of the index of industrial production
and the logarithm of the index of industrial employment (IFS tape,
for the U.K. the source is OECD[1987b]).
r: Required rate of return on capital or profit rate. Set to
15% for both regimes.
p: Inverse of the markup factor. Set to 0.6, which is the
average of the estimates of this parameter in Burda[1987] for the
four countries we are dealing with.
B) Hiring costs: We only have data for training costs.
Calculations on data in Nollen[1987] give a maximum value of 6.6%
of the average annual wage as the average training cost in Germany
and 5.5% in the U.K., the latter not including on-the-job-training
nor wages lost. We set H to 0.083 (1 months' pay).
C) Firing costs:
a) Notice period: The laws require a number of days per year of
service (p.y.o.s.) with the firm. In terms of the cost, we equate
one month of notice with one month of wage. Since the worker will
be producing during the notice period this is an upper bound,
equal to the payment in lieu of notice that can be made.
b) Expected dismissal cost: This is equal to:
F = N + (l-P )SP + P {(l-P) (SP+LC) + P (UP+LC)}
a a u u
where N is the notice c~st, P is the probability of the dismissal
a
being appealed to the labor courts, P is the probability that the
u
dismissal is ruled unfair, SP is the severance payment, LC are
legal costs from going to court and UP is the payment for an
unfair dismissal (we ignore the rare cases where reinstatement of
the worker is mandated). We only have information on legal costs
for the U.K.: Daniel and Stilgoe[1978] quote data equivalent to
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1.8 to 5.6 months pay for these. We take 2 months' pay for all
countries.
The estimates for the parameter values are given in Table Al,
in the following page.
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FRANCE
TABLE A1
GERMANY ITALY I UNITED KINGDOM
NP 2 months 1.5 months 13 months 1 1.5 months
Indiv. dismiss. Minimum for whitelVhite collar: 1 week p.y.o.s.
period= 2 months collar workers !Consult.l/2-4 mo. ITenure profile
Collect. redund. with up to 5 IGovernm. 1 month for 1934 from
consultation: ,Iyears of service I from OECD[1986b]
1-3 months Collect.: 3 mths
SP 9 months' pay 17 months' pay
Law:O.675 of wage Hean of the dis-
Improv.=10% mth's tribution in
pay p.y.o.s. from Ochs[1976]
Reynaud-C. [1986] I
Tenure profile inl
OECD[1987a]-1978 I
9.5 months' p2.y
1 month p.y.o.s.
Tenure profile
for 1978 from
OECD[1986b]
1.5 months' I1ay
Nickell[1979]:
4-5 weeks 1969-77
P S,
a
UP 1 year
6.6% 4.25%
Gennard[1985]: Gennard[1985]
Prob[contested/ for 1978-80
works council
exists]=.1 (1977)
Falke et al [1981] I
llorkers covered
by a works coun-
cil = 66% (1978)
40' 24'
Sengenberger Gennard[1985]:
[1985]:Cases whe-~Cases not dismi-
re no compromise 88ed:40'
was reached Dismissals decla-
(1981) red unfair: 59% I
(1978-80) I
10 months' pay :1 year's pay
Emerson[1987]: IEmerson[1987]:
1 month p.y.o.s. not less than
Avg. tenure (1978) 5 months' pay
=10 years from I
OECD[1986b]
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9.23%
Gennard[1985]
for 1983
11'
EIRR[1977]:
8.18% in 1976
Gennard[1985]:
11.06% in 1983
2 months' pay
Nickell[1979l:
6.75 weeks'pay
Mean for 1972-77
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